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UNDUE PROCESS
Adam M. Samaha*
This Article explores the relationship of the US. Constitution to the costs of
government decision making. Constitutional law clearly can escalate these costs,
as when the Due Process Clauses are read to mandate additional procedure not
otherwise favored by decisionmakers. This much is understood But the
Constitution and its doctrine sometimes put downward pressure on decision
costs. We lack a systematic investigation of when this is, and should be, true. The
Article makes three general claims: (1) The entire Constitution tends to reduce
decision costs insofar as it is a focal point for confining disputes, and empirical
work suggests that adherence to the document might not accomplish much else.
(2) However, individual components of the text and its doctrine often increase
rather than decrease the costs of government decision making. (3) This situation
is not ideal. An intelligently crafted federal constitutional law of "undue process "
seems just as attractive as "due process," and some courts have experimented
with the former. Neither process theory nor implementation problems separate
the two concepts, as long as courts are not tasked with optimizing government
process. Yet the desirability of a generic undue process claim is tempered by the
very conventions that allow the Constitution as a whole to reduce decision costs.
Undue process claims therefore ought to be exceptional, even if occasionally
potent, elements offederal constitutional practice. The most plausible occasions
for successful objections are identified
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He has no equal on earth, being created without fear ... [O]f all
the sons ofpride he is the king. t
But because he is mortal, and subject to decay, as all other earthly
creatures are, . . . I shall in the next following chapters speak of his
diseases, and the causes of his mortality .... tt
INTRODUCTION
Locating the law of due process is too easy. Our statutes, regulations, case
reporters, and academic journals are packed with ideas about when government
makes decisions too precipitously, or without adequate participation, or with
insufficient assurance of accuracy. For example, the minimum process
necessary for a lawful government decision under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments is a renowned feature of the U.S. Constitution. And its associated
t Job 41:25-26 (Jerusalem).
tt THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 212 (Oxford Univ. Press 1996) (1651).
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scholarship has an almost immeasurable scope.1 Such inquiries are often
connected to an attitude about government. They treat the state as a force to be
feared and constrained, by process if nothing else.2 On this view, the most
valuable parts of the Constitution include its Due Process Clauses, preservation
of habeas corpus, overlapping authority on matters of war and peace, and
elaborate requirements for statute making and constitutional amendment.
Among the heroic instances of judicial intervention are marquee cases like
Gideon v. Wainwright,3 Goldberg v. Kelly,4 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer (Steel Seizure),5 and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.
If you want to understand "undue process"-the point at which
government decision making becomes too tardy, or too inclusive, or too careful
as a matter of law-there is far less material competing for your attention. This
is certainly true for constitutional law and theory. We do not have an integrated
examination of the Constitution for the caps it places, and should place, on
decision costs. Although the text seems to lack a crosscutting guarantee against
undue process, certain lines of constitutional law do cabin government
procedure. Animating their drive for recognition is a conviction that an
efficacious and efficient state is necessary to successful social life: that "the
vigor of government is essential to the security of liberty," not to mention other
demands for social justice. 7 A vigorous state and sensible resource allocation
1. For the years 1995 through 2005, more than 850 articles with "due process" in the
title appear in Westlaw's JLR database. Notable earlier efforts include Edward S. Corwin,
The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24 HARV. L. REV. 366 (1911),
and Lowell J. Howe, The Meaning of "Due Process of Law" Prior to the Adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 18 CAL. L. REv. 583 (1930).
2. See, e.g., David Cole, Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial Review and Individual
Rights in Times of Crisis, 101 MICH. L. REv. 2565, 2590 (2003) ("[T]he very reason that we
adopted a Constitution was that we understood that the people and their representatives
would be tempted to violate basic principles in times of stress."); Abner S. Greene, Checks
and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 123, 125 (1994) ("To
the extent that there is any 'original understanding' of the division of power between the
President and Congress, it is that both are to be feared, neither is to be trusted, and if either
one grows too strong we might be in trouble."); Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of
Powers: Checking Today's Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2344
(2006) ("[A] starting point for our government is the evil of government efficiency.").
3. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (requiring state-provided lawyers for certain criminal
defendants).
4. 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (requiring hearings before termination of certain welfare
benefits).
5. 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (denying presidential power to solve a labor-management
dispute through mill seizure without clearer signs of congressional consent).
6. 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2772-75, 2786-97 (2006) (finding insufficient statutory authority
for the trial of certain detainees by special military commission); id. at 2799 (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (lauding judicial insistence on statutory authorization, absent emergency); id.
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (endorsing such legislation as "the result of a deliberative and
reflective process engaging both of the political branches").
7. THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at 35 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961);
see, e.g., SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, WELFARE AND THE CONSTITUTION 15 (2003)
December 2006]
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are jeopardized by excessive hand-wringing, all-inclusive roundtable
deliberation, and unrealistic hopes for perfection. On this view, we ought to
cheer for arcane provisions like the default date for congressional assembly and
the rules of presidential succession, 8 along with the Double Jeopardy, Speedy
Trial, and Full Faith and Credit Clauses.9 We should celebrate pitifully obscure
decisions such as Hollingsworth v. Virginia,'0 Klopfer v. North Carolina," and
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc. 12
Even casual observers understand that government decision making can be
too costly as a matter of ordinary policy. Opposition to excessive decision costs
is shared by everyone from Ronald Dworkin and Richard Posner 13 to Charles
Dickens and Franz Kafka. 14 Most of us already see that decision costs are as
real as error costs, and that sometimes "the process is the punishment"'15 or
"[j]ustice delayed is justice denied." 16 Anyone who forgot these lessons was
reminded of them by the trial of Slobodan Milosevic and the relief effort
following Hurricane Katrina. The international criminal proceedings against
Milosevic lasted four years, cost perhaps tens of millions of dollars, and failed
to reach judgment before the defendant died. 17 In New Orleans, the delays were
much shorter yet still devastating. Thousands were stranded for days without
food, shelter, or medical care. Many were in places accessible to the news
("[C]onstitutional government, 'is still government .... ); STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND
CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 153 (1995) ("The American
Constitution is an instrument of government, not an obstacle to government .. "); Elena
Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REv. 2245, 2263 (2001) ("[B]ureaucracy
also has inherent vices (even pathologies), foremost among which are inertia and torpor.").
8. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 2, superseded by U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 2; id. art.
II, § 1, cl. 6; id. amend. XX, §§ 3-4; id amend. XXV.
9. See id art. IV, § 1; id amends. V, VI.
10. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798) (discussed below in Part II.B.2.a).
11. 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (discussed below in Part Il.B. 1).
12. 514 U.S. 211 (1995) (discussed below in Part II.B.2.c).
13. See RONALD DWORKIN, Principle, Policy, Procedure, in A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE
72, 77-78 (1985) (denying rights to the most accurate procedures); RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 563 (6th ed. 2003) (summing error and decision costs).
14. See CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOULE 13-14 (Stephen Gill ed., Oxford Univ. Press
1996) (1853) (discussing the everlasting suit of Jarndyce v. Jarndyce); FRANZ KAFKA, THE
TRIAL 234-36 (Willa Muir & Edwin Muir trans., Alfred A. Knopf 1992) (1925) (describing
the door-keeper to Law).
15. MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A
LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 30-31 (1979); cf GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW
111 (1977) ("In Hell there will be nothing but law, and due process will be meticulously
observed.").
16. LAURENCE J. PETER, PETER'S QUOTATIONS 276 (1977) (attributing the quotation to
William Gladstone); cf. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. I, 11. 70-80 (Dover
Publ'ns, Inc. 1963) (1623) ("For who would beare... the Lawes delay ... But that the dread
of something after death ... Puzels the will .... ").
17. See David Scheffer, Jostling over Justice, FOREIGN POL'Y, May-June 2006, at 4;
see also Eric A. Posner, Political Trials in Domestic and International Law, 55 DUKE L.J.
75, 146-47 (2005).
(Vol. 59:601
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media but not to relief workers operating within a confused and multi-layered
decision structure. 1
8
But is excessive process, like inadequate process, a constitutional problem
in the United States? The best answer is awkward: the entire Federal
Constitution is about reducing decision costs but most of its parts are not. As to
the whole, the characterization does not rely on a deep theory about the proper
substance of constitutional law. Like it or not, the text is a focal point that tends
to confine the scope of disputes.' 9 In fact, this is just about the only sound
reason to pay attention to the text. Some empirical work in economics and
political science, largely ignored in the law literature, suggests as much.20 But
the local picture is unlike the global view. In contrast with state constitutions
inspired by the Magna Carta, 21 enforceable undue process norms are somewhat
exceptional in federal constitutional law, whether we focus on plain text or
judicial doctrine. Ordinarily the judiciary imposes procedural minima, not
maxima, through its federal constitutional decisions.
The question is whether this state of affairs is defensible. Can judicially
enforced and other due process norms comfortably coexist with the usual
absence of undue process norms? There is room for debate on this point but the
answer is likely no, as a matter of principle. The arguments are almost equally
strong for generic, entrenched, judicially enforceable due process and undue
process norms. The current tilt toward due process is probably an artifact of
centralization fears in past generations-a slant that underestimates nonsalient
process costs borne by the general public, along with the threat of a government
that is crippled or that leverages its control over procedure to obtain submission
or bribes. Furthermore, whatever hope or hesitation one should have about
supreme judicial review in due process disputes largely carries over into undue
process territory. Asking the judiciary to engineer "optimal process" through
constitutional doctrine is imprudent, but a modest undue process norm would
likely accomplish more good than harm. Like modem due process doctrine, the
claim could incorporate deference to other officials and be fenced off from
generally applicable rulemaking.
But the concrete issues are not about pure principle, nor are we faced with
redrafting the Constitution. This restricts the scope of defensible undue process
claims. Establishing a generic undue process norm might entail the kind of
creativity that is disfavored by the decision-cost minimizing role of the existing
18. See SELECT BIPARTISAN COMM. TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND
RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA, A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE: FINAL REPORT, H.R. REP. No.
109-377 (2006); DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, THE GREAT DELUGE 19-24, 90-92 (2006). Blame is
still being studied and assessed.
19. See David A. Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson's Principle,
112 YALE L.J. 1717, 1725, 1731-35 (2003) (using the focal point idea against dead hand
objections); infra Part II.A. 1.
20. See infra Part II.A.2.
21. See infra Part II.B.1.
December 20061
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text. Oddly, then, the one global element of federal constitutional law likely to
reduce decision costs-fidelity to text as understood through some interpretive
method-is the most important barrier to infusing undue process norms into
every government operation. Indeed, the opportunity for judicial review itself
tends to increase decision costs, which are not easily reduced by ready-made
constitutional rules for this field.
The analysis below proceeds in three parts. Part I identifies several
episodes in which government process arguably has run out of control, and it
introduces connections and distinctions between due and undue process. The
concepts of decision and decision costs are then specified. Part II searches
federal constitutional law for its relationship to undue process. The connection
is two-fold. First, the Constitution tends to cut decision costs insofar as it is a
reference for dispute resolution. Contemporary empirical studies prompt the
question whether constitutional law is capable of doing much else. Second,
certain federal constitutional provisions and doctrines serve undue process
missions. A potentially explosive phenomenon involves lower court extensions
of Mathews v. Eldridge.2 2 These cases intimate a federal undue process claim
with a scope rivaling the area now reached by conventional due process
doctrine, and they motivate much of the normative analysis in Part II. No one
has presented a constitutional theory of undue process to date,23 but certain due
process theories can be retrofitted to provide guidance. The question of judicial
review is also taken up in Part Ill. It concludes that neither theory nor practical
issues of enforcement will easily distinguish due from undue process. They are
global norms of approximately equal attractiveness. But textualism and
incremental judicial reasoning can confine the latter without eliminating the
former. Many undue process claims are self-defeating in a way that most due
process claims are not. The closing sections of this Article isolate the most
plausible undue process objections.
I. DECISION AND COST
A. Nightmares
1. Stroud Township
Woodwind Estates, Ltd., wanted to build affordable subdivision housing in
Stroud Township, Pennsylvania. It qualified for over one million dollars in
low-income housing tax credits to do it. But the state agency administering the
credits conditioned their use on the development being complete within about
22. 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (refusing to require a pre-deprivation hearing as a matter of
"due process").
23. Preliminary thoughts can be found in Adam M. Samaha, Undue Process:
Congressional Referral and Judicial Resistance in the Schiavo Controversy, 22 CONST.
COMMENT. 505, 522-28 (2005).
[Vol. 59:601
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twenty-eight months. Some local politicians and residents had no interest in
allowing the developer to meet that deadline or any other. They were concerned
about "the socioeconomic background of prospective tenants. 24 This was not a
reason for rejecting the plan under the relevant ordinance, however, and the
town planning commission's attorney concluded that the development qualified
for approval as a subdivision. None of this mattered. The commission first
declared that the plan lacked certain technical information. Next it sat on the
revised plan for six months. Then it recommended denial of the plan, which
was the course followed by the local board of supervisors. The board
maintained that the plan had to follow the more demanding procedure for a
planned unit development. The developer started to seek judicial review in state
court, 25 but it was too late. Concluding the homes could no longer be built
before the state agency's deadline, the developer cancelled the project. The
developer later sought damages in federal court asserting a violation of
"substantive due process."26
2. Katrina and FEMA
Hundreds of thousands of people were displaced from their homes by
Hurricane Katrina in August 2005. Televised pictures of those stranded in New
Orleans were available every day. As news coverage became less intense, new
bureaucratic problems mounted. One involved applications for disaster
assistance from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Three
months after the storm, approximately 80,000 applications were listed as
unprocessed by FEMA.27 Many of the applicants for housing assistance were
fortunate in the sense that the Red Cross had placed them in hotels and motels
free of charge, and the federal government had taken over payment obligations
for that effort. But FEMA wanted to discontinue the hotel/motel program and
this decision escalated storm victims' demand for swift processing of their
assistance applications. A putative class action was filed on their behalf,
requesting preservation of hotel/motel housing and challenging FEMA's
processing delays as a violation of the right to "due process" of law.
24. Woodwind Estates, Ltd. v. Gretkowski, 205 F.3d 118, 120-21 (3d Cir. 2000)
(describing the developer's evidence at trial).
25. See Woodwind Estates, Ltd. v. Gretkowski, 39 F. Supp. 2d 537, 539 (M.D. Pa.
1999).
26. See Woodwind Estates, 205 F.3d at 122, 125.
27. See McWaters v. FEMA, 408 F. Supp. 2d 221, 227, 232 & n.13 (E.D. La. 2005)
(opinion modified Jan. 12, 2006).
December 2006]
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3. Death row
Some observers estimate that the total cost of reaching an execution is over
one million dollars and substantially greater than imposing lesser penalties.
28
Part of the cost is associated with procedural protections for the accused, from
pretrial proceedings to habeas corpus. In addition, many capital defendants are
indigent and the state may not leave them without legal assistance at trial or for
an initial appeal. 29 These outlays do not purchase speed, however. For an
inmate on death row in 2004, the average time since the last sentence of death
was about ten years. 3° Such figures can be used to question the burden on
taxpayers and the possibility of deterrence, but the situation could be injurious
to inmates as well. Years in prison facing death might impose unjustifiable
suffering. A few foreign nations that retain the death penalty now have court-
imposed limits on the delay between sentence and execution, and some U.S.
lawyers contend that death sentences should be abrogated as cruel and unusual
punishment when delay is excessive and attributable to the government. 3 ' One
complication is deciding how to fashion a test for "excessive" delay. Some
Supreme Court Justices might be comfortable with multi-factor inquiries,
perhaps evolving into rules. Others seem to believe it is their duty to construct
hard-and-fast constitutional doctrine up front, or not at all.32
4. Filibusters
In 1806, the rules of the Senate were revised, omitting nondebatable
previous question motions. This new edition of the rules opened the way,
perhaps inadvertently, to the modem filibuster. 33 By the end of the century,
senators developed a practice by which they could threaten legislation and
28. See PHILIP J. COOK & DONNA B. SLAWSON, THE COSTS OF PROCESSING MURDER
CASES IN NORTH CAROLINA 1, 97-99 (1993) (studying net excess cost to a state and its
counties per sentence and execution); Katherine Baicker, The Budgetary Repercussions of
Capital Convictions, 4 ADVANCES ECoN. ANALYSIS & POL'Y No. 1, Art. 6, at 2, 10-14 (2004),
http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/advances/vol4/issl/art6 (studying county expenditures).
29. See, e.g., Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 7-11 (1989) (plurality opinion).
30. See THOMAS P. BONCZAR & TRACY L. SNELL, Capital Punishment, 2004, BUREAU
OF JUST. STATS. BULL., Nov. 2005, at 15 app. tbl.3 (revised Feb. 1, 2006) (providing data for
states with ten or more inmates on death row), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/
bjs/abstract/cp04.htm.
31. See, e.g., Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 995 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari); Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1045-46 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
respecting denial of certiorari).
32. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. ClI. L. REV. 1175,
1183 (1989); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword: The
Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 26 (1992).
33. See SARAH A. BINDER & STEVEN S. SMITH, POLITICS OR PRINCIPLE? FILIBUSTERING
IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE 1-27, 33-40 (1997) (claiming previous question motions were
sometimes used by opponents of proposals, who achieved a day or more of delay by losing
on the motion).
[Vol. 59:601
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appointments with open-ended debate. Senate rules were amended during the
twentieth century to address the filibuster, but the tactic was not eliminated.
Rule XXII currently requires three-fifths of all senators to successfully invoke
cloture, 34 and contemporary practice usually avoids the spectacle of filibuster
supporters actually having to hold the floor. Although filibusters may be
controlled informally, the practical effect of Senate practice is to enhance the
power of minority factions and even individual senators compared to outcomes
under a majority voting rule for cloture. Some believe that the status quo is
unconstitutional.35
5. "Peanut butter"
For certain types of orders, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) must
conduct trial-type hearings to resolve objections. 36 An ingredient-based
definition for any product calling itself "peanut butter" was one such order as
of 1959. In that year, FDA proposed that "peanut butter" contain at least 95%
peanuts. Manufacturers of the leading brands were unhappy. Theirs contained
only 87% peanuts. 37 Two years later, the agency blinked and published an
order cutting the peanut-content requirement to 90%. The manufacturers were
unmoved. FDA issued a revised order in 1965, but the 90% clause remained,
and the order could not take effect before the manufacturers' objections were
resolved. The agency got around to holding a hearing in late 1965. With
extensive testimony and cross-examination, it went on for twenty weeks and
7736 pages of transcript. 38 It was not until 1968 that the FDA completed its
revised order. The Third Circuit denied a challenge to the final version in 1970,
which salvaged the 90% clause.
39
Worry about agency ability to swiftly and efficiently adopt major new rules
is the theme of administrative law's ossification literature. 40 The concern
extends to notice-and-comment rulemaking, not just formal rulemaking with
34. See STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOc. No. 106-15, R. XXII, cl. 2 (2000).
35. See, e.g., John C. Roberts, Majority Voting in Congress: Further Notes on the
Constitutionality of the Senate Cloture Rule, 20 J.L. & POL. 505, 520 (2004). But see, e.g.,
Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitutionality of the Filibuster, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 445
(2004).
36. The current version of the statute is codified at 21 U.S.C. § 371(e)(1) (2006).
37. See Peanut Butter: Notice of Proposal to Establish Definition and Standard of
Identity, 24 Fed. Reg. 5391 (proposed June 25, 1959) (judging by the weight of the finished
food); Robert W. Hamilton, Rulemaking on a Record by the Food and Drug Administration,
50 TEX. L. REV. 1132, 1143 (1972).
38. See Hamilton, supra note 37, at 1143-44.
39. See Corn Prods. Co. v. FDA, 427 F.2d 511, 517 (3d Cir. 1970). The current version
of the order is at 21 C.F.R. § 164.150 (2005).
40. See, e.g., Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking
Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1385-86, 1412 (1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The APA and
Regulatory Reform, 10 ADMIN. L.J. 81, 82-84 (1996); infra note 262.
December 2006]
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trial-type hearings. 4 1 Some commentators blame courts. Attempting to better
insulate a proposed rule from a judicial "hard look" at the record and the
agency's decision,42 an agency might lard on explanations, justifications, and
responses to public comments. This boosts the resources necessary for such
rulemaking, slows the progression from a proposal to an enforceable rule, and
may increase the probability that any rule will do more harm than good in fields
of rapid change. In the alternative, agency officials might abandon both formal
and notice-and-comment rulemaking in favor of less overt mechanisms for
making policy.
43
6. Yucca Mountain
In the 1950s, the National Research Council of the National Academy of
Sciences (NAS) began studying how best to store underground the radioactive
waste from nuclear power plants and weapons production." There remained
the decision about where to locate any such facility, but a coalition formed to
prevent radioactive waste from continuing to accumulate at more than one
hundred sites around the country. In 1982, Congress granted the Department of
Energy (DOE) authority to build and operate an underground geologic
repository, and it charged the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) with composing rules on emissions
and licensing for the facility.4 5 DOE conducted a preliminary investigation and
recommended three sites for more intensive study. The President signed off on
the recommendation in 1985. Then Congress narrowed the options in 1987,
ordering DOE to study only one site: Yucca Mountain, Nevada, a ridge ninety
miles from Las Vegas in an area that has already been used to test nuclear
weapons.
4 6
Much more process was to come, including public input, scientific
investigation, agency rulemaking, state and local political reaction, and
litigation. More than one hundred public hearings and a year and a half of
public comment took place between 1995 and 2001. At the tail end of that
41. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 556-557 (2006).
42. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 34 (1983) (holding an agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously by offering inadequate
basis and explanation for a rule change); cf 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006) (requiring "a concise
general statement of [rule] basis and purpose").
43. See JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 10-
14, 19, 224-54 (1990) (examining a shift after 1976 from new general safety standards to
motor vehicle recalls).
44. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE DISPOSAL OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE ON LAND
(1957).
45. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 10132-10134, 10141(a)-(b) (2006).
46. See Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 1259-60 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(per curiam).
47. See 42 U.S.C. § 10134(a)(1) (2006) (requiring hearings near Yucca); OFFICE OF
[Vol. 59:601
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period, EPA, NRC, and DOE spent two years developing new standards for a
repository at Yucca in light of statutorily required advice from NAS. 48 Nearing
the Act's twentieth anniversary in 2002, the Secretary of Energy found the
Yucca site suitable and recommended it for a permit application to NRC.49
This triggered an additional procedural check. The 1982 legislation granted
Nevada's governor or legislature a veto over the project, which could be
overridden by a congressional resolution. 50 Nevada's governor objected and
Congress overrode his opposition.51 Yet construction remains stalled. DOE is
still working on a permit from NRC. And the D.C. Circuit recently held that the
repository must be designed to reasonably assure no excess radiation emission
for perhaps one million years, in accord with statute and NAS
recommendations. 52 EPA had hoped that ten thousand years would be
sufficient, but the agency must revise its rule and DOE must reassess its design.
DOE's current goal is to open the facility in 2017. .
B. Conceptual Introduction
Lawyers have traced and deconstructed the concepts of "procedure" and
"substance" for so long that the questions are no longer very interesting. It is
widely understood that procedural rules (however specifically defined) can
trump substantive rights (however specifically defined), and that these
substantive values can bend procedural norms. The degree to which the
CIVILIAN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MGMT., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, RECOMMENDATION BY THE
SECRETARY OF ENERGY REGARDING THE SUITABILITY OF THE YUCCA MOUNTAIN SITE FOR A
REPOSITORY UNDER THE NUCLEAR WASTE POLICY ACT OF 1982, at 32 (2002) [hereinafter
DOE RECOMMENDATION] (estimating site evaluation costs at $4 billion).
48. See Yucca Mountain Site Suitability Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,298 (Nov. 14,
2001) (codified at 10 C.F.R. pts. 960, 963); Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Wastes in a
Proposed Geologic Repository at Yucca Mountain, NV, 66 Fed. Reg. 55,732 (Nov. 2, 2001)
(codified in scattered parts of 10 C.F.R.); Public Health and Environmental Radiation
Protection Standards for Yucca Mountain, NV, 66 Fed. Reg. 32,074 (June 13, 2001)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 197).
49. See DOE RECOMMENDATION, supra note 47, at 45-46.
50. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 10135(b)-(c), 10136(b)(2) (2006). The statute also attempts to
eliminate procedural roadblocks to a vote on a siting resolution in either House, including
time limits on floor debate. See id. § 10135(d)-(f). Assuming the resolution is presented to
the President for a highly improbable veto option, there is no problem under INS v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919 (1983) (discussed below in Part II.B.2.a).
51. See Pub. L. No. 107-200, 116 Stat. 735 (2002).
52. See Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 1267-73, 1299-1301 (D.C.
Cir. 2004) (per curiam); see also Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 801(a),
106 Stat. 2776, 2921-23 (1992) (stating that the agency rules must be "based upon and
consistent with" the findings and recommendations of NAS). NAS recommended a time
period it thought feasible for scientific analysis and long enough to include the greatest
radiation risks. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, TECHNICAL BASES FOR YUCCA MOUNTAIN
STANDARDS 6, 55 (1995).
53. See U.S. Dep't of Energy, Yucca Mountain Repository Schedule (July 19, 2006),
available at http://www.ocrwm.doe.gov/infolibrary/newsroom/documents/CtrSchedule.pdf.
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judiciary might be illegitimately clouding the surviving distinctions is also
exhaustively investigated by academics. Attention to the procedure/substance
dichotomy threatens more than tedium, however. It can overshadow equally
important problems involving government decision making. One of them is the
issue of process, or decision cost, that is excessive as opposed to inadequate.
Existing constitutional law and theory sometimes grapple with this dimension,
sometimes within the looser understandings of "due process of law." But only
sometimes, and not systematically.
The six controversies detailed above help expose the dimension of undue
process. They arise in wildly different settings, they implicate vastly different
trade-offs, and they scrape several ideological sensitivities. But in one way they
are fundamentally the same: each poses a question about decision costs. A
decision is on the agenda of a government official or institution, and the
process surrounding that decision is generating burdens of debatable value. The
decision might be trivial or monumental. The costs might be suffered primarily
by private parties or substantially shared with frustrated government officials.
The cause of the burden might be official self-interest and bad faith, or resource
constraints and negligence, or interest-group tactics and coalition-building
politics. Because different syndromes are at work, different remedies might be
appropriate. But regardless of the culprits, victims, and goals at stake,
government decision making can be excessively burdensome or even, as we
shall see, unconstitutional.
Some conceptual slipperiness should be noted before going further,
however. To an extent, the due/undue distinction can be deconstructed just like
the substance/process distinction. Shifting the status quo, legal entitlements,
and our perspective may convert some orthodox-sounding due process
objections into complaints about decision costs, and vice versa. Think about a
simple adversarial dispute in which A sues B for possession of land. If A bears
the burden of persuasion, A will demand some process for introducing
favorable evidence. B presumably is disadvantaged by this "due" process
demand in that B is more likely to suffer an adverse decision, and B might then
resist A's demand as "undue" process, or ask for additional ("due") process to
combat the persuasiveness of A's evidence. While granting both demands for
more process might enhance judicial accuracy, the arguments have a zero-sum
quality. So if instead A was in possession of the property and B filed suit, or B
otherwise had the burden of persuasion, nothing analytically significant has
changed. One might now label B's initial demand for process a question of
"due" process and label A's possible resistance a complaint about "undue"
process, but the structure of these disputes is the same. In fact, A might argue
for more process as a remedy for unjustified attention to B, thus combining an
"undue" process objection with a "due" process solution. The reverse is also
possible: an argument to cut off any more process for B so that A's interests are
not lost from view. The due/undue distinction could then be characterized as an
artifact of the status quo, substantive entitlements, or labeling conventions, and
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one might say the court's mission in any event is to offer "optimal" process to
warring parties.
More will be said on these subjects below but a few points can be made
here. The present inquiry concerns the role of the U.S. Constitution and judicial
review in limiting decision costs. Optimizing government process is the
ultimate policy goal, but that directive might not make sense as enforceable
constitutional law. The latter might aim for something less or different,
especially if courts will have the final word on the relevant questions.54 Aside
from this complication, it is plainly true that commitments to substantive
entitlements affect how process claims-all process claims-play out.
Dedication to a particular conception of political speech or physical liberty or
private property can make irrelevant the precise method of injury. Process can
be the means of imposing burdens on highly valued entitlements, much like a
fine or a tax; accordingly, labels like "due" and "undue" may become
unimportant. It is also true, however, that these substantive commitments can
be sticky. When constitutionally grounded, entitlements are difficult to
rearrange and so stable patterns of due and undue process claims are likely to
emerge. Although these entitlements can be threatened by officials who either
ignore their substantive value or attend to excessive protocol when making
decisions, both kinds of threats should be recognized. 55
In some ways, the most intriguing cases involve softer entitlements, where
the scales are not already seriously tipped in one direction or where decision
costs are suffered by less visible groups. Certain government procedures are
more sensitive to one kind of decision cost than another, by design or
otherwise. When A sues B in a simple property dispute, costs are borne by
third-party taxpayers C1, who are not ordinarily thought to have justiciable
legal entitlements at stake. 56 The costs are nonetheless real, and if the
adjudicator is systematically overgenerous in granting process demands from
both the As and Bs of the world, then we have an undue process issue. This is
so even if process rights for A and B are perfectly well apportioned between
them. 57 Here the unaddressed problem is a decisionmaker too focused on
54. See infra Part III.A.
55. See infra Part II.B.2.b. Hence "undue process" concerns can be addressed through
entitlements. Some of these entitlements are usually considered substantive, like speech
rights. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. Others might be called procedural, like the warrant
requirement for certain seizures and the prohibition on excessive bail. See id. amends. IV,
VIII. The latter provisions cap process burdens on suspects and ensure process burdens for
the state, where a contrary allocation presents risks that are in some sense intolerable-that
is, where we are more concerned about one type of error (mistaken detention) than another
(mistaken physical liberty).
56. See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 126 S. Ct. 1854, 1862-64 (2006). A
taxpayer complaint would presumably demand less process for the litigants, not additional
process for taxpayer input on the dispute-beyond what is necessary to establish the problem
and cure it going forward.
57. This may also be so even if the parties would be happy with less effort-although
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salient parties in maximizing information and accuracy, participation and case-
specific legitimacy, or some other value. Similarly, when A applies for financial
assistance from a government agency or when B is detained on suspicion of
criminal activity, potential assistance applicant C1 and possible crime victim C2
face risks that could be heightened by procedural safeguards for A and B.58
Moreover, trade-offs are being made along multiple dimensions. The burdens
of delayed decisions, types of error, and financial cost are suffered differently
by different people depending on the circumstances. When A and B are locked
in a custody dispute and focused on accuracy and their participation, child C
might suffer more from a delayed disposition than from any conceivable
outcome on the merits.59 All of this makes it difficult to wash away due and
undue process distinctions by rearranging typical entitlements for a given type
of dispute, even when constitutional and other constraints permit it.
The six exemplary "nightmares" are reconsidered at the end of this Article.
They involve process costs and trade-offs of the variety just indicated. But
before constitutional law can be understood on these points, the concept of
decision cost and its leading components should be specified.
C. Working Definitions
1. Decision
To make certain nothing important in constitutional law is overlooked, our
working definitions ought to be inclusive. "Decision" can therefore take a
common meaning, albeit restricted to state actors. It means the resolution of an
issue on the agenda of a government official or institution, involving a choice
among courses of action or.inaction that alters the status quo. This reaches
well beyond critical forks in human affairs. It includes not only promulgation
of an enforceable regulation but also the choice of rulemaking procedures; not
only holdings in Supreme Court cases but also denials of certiorari; not only
enactment of statutes but also ending of debate. In any case, we should assume
that consequences follow decisions and that undoing those consequences would
cost something. Furthermore, any decision can be characterized along several
dimensions. 60 Three are worth noting, because they directly impact tolerance
self-help will sometimes be available (for example, negotiated settlement), and there may be
offsetting public benefits to a public resolution of the dispute. See Owen M. Fiss, Against
Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085, 1087 (1984) (promoting a judicial role in explicating
public values); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8
J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 236, 238-42, 261 (1979) (suggesting precedent production as an
adjudicatory output that might be best provided with government intervention).
58. See infra Part III.B.2.d (discussing quasi-Mathews cases).
59. See Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interest of the Child, 54 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1, 22-24 (1987).
60. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT 17 tbl.1.1, 21 tbl.1.2 (1999) (studying judicial decisions and employing
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for decision costs and the incentives of interested parties to engage in conduct
that increases them.
First, a decision occupies an area. It aims to affect the environment within
a subdivision of all government power. Compare, for example, a congressional
appropriation for a pilot project with a federal prescription drug benefit.61
Second, a decision might have a prescribed duration. Some decisions are
definitely temporary. Their makers want the decision to expire on a date certain
absent additional effort, as with sunset provisions in legislation and
constitutions. 62 Other decisions have no such expiration date and their time
frame is in that sense indefinite. Third, and closely related, different degrees of
resilience attach to a decision, regardless of an expiration date. Often a decision
is, formally, just as easy to take back as it was to make. Ordinary statutes are
like this. Alternatively, law sometimes makes a decision more difficult to
unsettle than to issue. Federal courts treat their final judgments this way:
Congress and Article III tribunals might have flexibility in deciding which
judgments should issue and when they become final, but the Supreme Court
has held that reopening those judgments raises constitutional questions. 63 This
is not to suggest that formal law alone dictates resilience or duration. Statutes
with sunset provisions are sometimes habitually renewed, while inertia, agenda
control, and path dependence can harden initial decisions as well as any
resilience rule. The point is that decisions cover variable amounts of territory,
in terms of their expected longevity and area of impact.
categories of narrow/wide, shallow/deep, minimal/nonminimal, and strong/weak stare
decisis).
61. Cf William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215,
1216 (2001) (pointing out variety in statutory impact). Sunstein separates the theoretical
depth of a decision from its operative width. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 60, at 16-19. Both
ideas can be combined into "area." To the extent that deep theoretical commitment affects
other decisions, it increases the area of decision.
62. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 2; id. art. I, § 9, cl. 1; id. art. V;
Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary Legislation, 74 U. CHi. L. REv. (forthcoming 2007). The
Supreme Court has imported a similar idea into constitutional doctrine: the suggestion that
race-based affirmative action in university admissions can survive for only twenty-five more
years. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 342-43 (2003); cf Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542
U.S. 656, 671-72 (2004) (recognizing the possibility of intervening technological change and
a different outcome at trial).
63. See infra Part II.B.2. Law might attempt to make reversal even easier than the
initial decision. But these rules are often undesirable and unstable. Decisionmakers might
spin-cycle through contradictory outcomes, or the formal arrangement will disintegrate. A
purported majority voting rule, for example, may effectively become an ongoing
supermajority requirement, as proponents of change anticipate instability without a long-
term agreement from members of the minority. See David M. Barton, Comment,
Constitutional Choice and Simple Majority Rule, 81 J. POL. EcoN. 471, 474-79 (1973)
(analyzing submajority rules); see also Adrian Venneule, Submajority Rules: Forcing
Accountability upon Majorities, 13 J. POL. PHIL. 74, 74-79, 89-92 (2005) (claiming that
institutions thankfully use submajority rules, if at all, for preliminary, procedural, and
agenda-setting decisions that tend to be difficult to reverse).
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Part of making a decision is plugging values into these three variables. As
the values become clearer, it becomes easier to evaluate whether reaching the
decision was cost-justified. When the decision is meant to temporarily govern a
thin slice of human life with little significance to the governed parties, probably
no substantial effort should be expended on the decision. The opposite is
usually true for decisions that affect the lives of many people, in ways intensely
important to them, with no sunset to limit the experiment, and when course
corrections are especially difficult.
64
2. Decision costs
The idea of "decision cost" has been used by academics for decades,
65
usually without elaboration. The present study calls for some specification
because not all of the concept is intuitive.
The key distinction is between decision costs and error costs. Decision
costs are associated with reaching a decision; error costs are a possible
consequence of that decision. Thus decision costs are generated before reaching
any decision at all. Error costs, in contrast, depend on a decision. There is
disagreement over precisely what counts as cost rather than benefit, but for now
the concept can be inclusive. "Decision costs" therefore means any burden,
such as a resource expenditure or opportunity cost, associated with reaching
decision. This covers time, money, and emotional distress from uncertainty,
conflict, worry, and the like. 66 And it reaches everyone who bears these costs,
whether public or private actors. Civil litigation, for instance, generates
decision costs for taxpayers, judges, plaintiffs, defendants, witnesses, and
others as disputants move toward settlement or judgment.
One obvious driver of decision costs is "process." Every official decision is
arrived at by a method. Occasionally it is elaborate, as with the decision trees
and influence diagrams recommended for complex problems by some decision
analysts.6 7 In other circumstances an official will rely on less, including snap
64. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *423
("[M]ore time and circumspection are requisite in causes, where the suitors have valuable
and permanent rights to lose .. "); Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-
Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 17 (1996).
65. Early development of the concept appears in JAMES BUCHANAN & GORDON
TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT ch. 6 (1962) (analyzing voting rules), and Richard A.
Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL
STUD. 399, 400-02, 441-51 (1973) (calling for a summation of "direct costs" and error costs,
and emphasizing their interaction). A related label is "evaluation costs." E.g., John R. Hauser
& Birger Wemerfelt, An Evaluation Cost Model of Consideration Sets, 16 J. CONSUMER RES.
393, 395 (1990).
66. See Charles R. Adrian & Charles Press, Decision Costs in Coalition Formation, 62
AM. POL. Sci. REv. 556, 556 (1968); Vernon L. Smith, Rational Choice: The Contrast
Between Economics and Psychology, 99 J. POL. ECON. 877, 888 (1991).
67. See PAUL GOODWIN & GEORGE WRIGHT, DECISION ANALYSIS FOR MANAGEMENT
JUDGMENT 143-44 (3d ed. 2004).
[Vol. 59:601
HeinOnline  -- 59 Stan. L. Rev. 616 2006-2007
UNDUE PROCESS
judgment governed by heuristics. Either way, the issue of process is
unavoidable. And the concept can be defined as any conduct for the purpose of
reaching a government decision, including conduct that is lawfully compelled
by or from private parties. This definition captures action designed to influence
a decision even if it is ultimately ignored, while limiting the concept to action
associated with the decision-making environment. Thus the rules of debate on
the Senate floor govern process, as do the rules of discovery for civil litigation,
but a speed limit does not.6
8
Typical features of government process can be quickly isolated. Process
always includes at least one decisionmaker and an agenda. No official is able to
consider every issue, so the labor of each is divided and devoted to different (if
overlapping) issue agendas, which are constructed in several ways. 69 Beyond
this, three elements are important. First is the selection of participants. In
addition to those with decision-making authority, a given process determines
who else should have input. Second, information collection is part of every
process except, perhaps, snap judgments. Decisions with any scrap of reflection
will rely on data and other forms of knowledge, such as testimony during a
public hearing, or prices on an information market, or an applicable rule of
decision. Third, a process, especially one with multiple participants and
significant information-gathering efforts, involves some kind of deliberation.
Deliberation-as in thinking through the proper resolution of a problem-is not
always easy to separate from information collection. But a process need not
include an effort to gather more data than is already known, or an increase in
participants. Each process element can be cumulative and each comes at a
price.
70
This working definition of process is so expansive, however, that it reaches
conduct some prize for its inherent value or for consequences aside from
reaching decision. The very task of enumerating decision costs turns on
68. Cf. Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REv. 181, 204-06 (2004)
(exploring adjudicatory procedure and focusing on institution-related conduct). I will not
directly consider the steps by which decisions are implemented, or the costs to private parties
of deciding how to respond to those decisions. This study is narrower, more manageable, and
still useful. We can also ignore the fine points of the substance/procedure distinction in the
Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a)-(b) (2006), and so painfully debated in post-Erie
case law. See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 426-27 (1996)
(citing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)). That distinction does not capture the
right set of phenomena.
69. See, e.g., Andrew J. Taylor, Domestic Agenda Setting, 194 7-1994, 23 LEGIS. STUD.
Q. 373, 387-88 (1998); B. Dan Wood & Jeffrey S. Peake, The Dynamics of Foreign Policy
Agenda Setting, 92 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 173, 174-75, 182 (1998).
70. When "substantive" law governs the standard for reaching a decision, it is
obviously connected to "process." But it can be distinguished. Often what we call
substantive law is an aspiration for human conduct, rather than an instrument for achieving
it. Most people are probably happy to have a legal norm of reasonably careful driving, but
they might be perfectly willing to eliminate the "process" involved in implementing that
norm if they could. "Process" so understood is a more likely candidate for sacrifice.
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controversial normative judgments about what counts as "cost." Debate within
a democratic institution, for example, can be valued because it generates public
information and helps interests evolve in a morally satisfying fashion. To
others, democracy is essentially a transaction cost.7 1 Similar judgments attach
to error costs. Dividing injury from benefit depends on a normative framework.
These divisions cannot all be stitched together here, of course. At the same
time, disputed territory should not obscure large areas of agreement. Think
about information collection. All else equal, we would rather that tax-paid
government officials have relevant information with zero burden-that they
immediately know everything they lawfully ought to know before making a
decision. That is impossible, of course, and so information collection often
entails regrettable costs.
Other decision-cost elements are obscure to the uninitiated. Some involve
the methods for aggregating judgments when multiple decisionmakers have
jurisdiction over the same issue. Countless scholars since Buchanan and
Tullock have analyzed the decision-cost implications of voting rules in
multimember bodies. 72 One message in this scholarship is that decision costs
for any particular decision escalate, sometimes exponentially, as the voting rule
dictates a greater degree of agreement among those eligible to vote. This is
especially true if group preferences are relatively heterogeneous.
73
Accordingly, unanimous consent is the most dangerous voting rule from a
decision-cost perspective. A majority rule is much less costly to satisfy on
average. Of course there are advantages to striving for consensus. For example,
overwhelming ex ante agreement might enhance the decision's legitimacy, as
in the willingness of affected parties to accept the outcome without struggle.
74
The lesson is about remembering the downside.
75
71. Compare BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS
FOR A NEW AGE xiv-xv, 117 (1984), with RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND
DEMOCRACY 154 (2003).
72. See BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 65, at 45-46, 63-84 (distinguishing
decision costs from "external costs"). In their model, the good/harm done by a decision is
just a function of who agreed to it.
73. See id. at 59-60, 68-69; Wayne L. Francis, Legislative Committee Systems, Optimal
Committee Size, and the Costs of Decision Making, 44 J. POL. 822, 823-24 (1982); Dennis C.
Mueller, Constitutional Public Choice, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE 124, 127-32
(Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997). These models sometimes count only the cost of persuading
others, so decision costs are zero for a single decisionmaker. See, e.g., BUCHANAN &
TULLOCK, supra note 65, at 68; Janet T. Landa, The Political Economy of Swarming in
Honeybees: Voting-with-the- Wings, Decision-Making Costs, and the Unanimity Rule, 51
PUB. CHOICE 25, 32 (1986). That understanding is too narrow for present purposes.
74. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV.
1787, 1795-96 (2005).
75. An extension of this principle helps explain delegation trade-offs. We might think
statutes entail higher average decision costs than agency regulations with the same content
because there are more veto gates or the decisionmakers have less knowledge or for some
other reason. Cf Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make
Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 91-92, 96-99 (1985).
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Another cost driver expands the analytical horizon into substantive law. It
is the well-worn choice between rules and standards, which have different cost
profiles over time. 76 A rule's specificity leaves less discretion at time 2 (2) and
so should reduce decision costs then and thereafter. The sacrifice is potentially
higher error costs from hamstrung decisionmakers at t2, along with higher
decision costs at time 1 (ti) when the rule must be crafted. The ongoing open-
endedness of a standard presents converse trades: the t, decision costs
associated with writing up a rule are avoided and error costs are hopefully
minimized every time the standard is applied, yet the standard's application at
t1 and t2 will probably have a higher average decision cost than a strict and
specific rule. Rules/standards scholarship thus encourages a survey of costs
over time.
This points to an additional consideration: dynamic interaction among
these elements and their influence on behavior across time. For example, a
decision's projected resilience could affect decision costs over time, although
the relationship is complex. The voting rule for changing a decision can
influence the willingness of people to attempt change. The difficulty is that the
implications seem contrary to some of the standard political science for voting
rules. A consensus voting rule is supposed to entail the greatest decision costs
to achieve change, but the rule might scare off proponents of change who have
little hope of achieving unanimity. Unless there are significant benefits from
trying and failing, a demand for change might not materialize. Nor would the
associated decision costs; the agenda would remain clear. 77 Similarly, a bare-
majority voting rule suggests lower decision costs with a set agenda and a one-
shot timeframe. But the cost advantage is less certain over time and when there
is a fluid agenda. Choosing this seemingly low-decision-cost process might
generate repeated campaigns for change and intolerable decision costs
aggregated through t,. If we care about sound policy over time and without a
fixed agenda, we should also consider the dynamic interaction of decision
dimensions and decision-cost elements. 7
8
76. See Isaac Erlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking,
3 J. LEGAL STuD. 257 (1974) (including consideration of the costs to private parties
associated with ascertaining the possibility of sanction); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus
Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 559-63, 586-96 (1992) (adding a
distinction between complexity and simplicity).
77. See POSNER, supra note 13, at 651 (using the example of the number of senators
per state, entrenched in constitutional text); Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism and
Secession, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 633, 639 (1991) (suggesting constitutions might take
controversial topics off the table). Another possibility is that high resilience will encourage a
supremely costly fight at 11 that overwhelms future savings, if t, participants account for the
higher stakes and care about future time periods.
78. Penalties for law violations can affect decision costs as well. High penalties might
deter people from conduct that even arguably violates positive law, thereby cutting the
number of cases that need to be prosecuted. But federal constitutional law seems to impose
caps on penalties rather than mandatory minimums. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7
(limiting impeachment consequences); id. amend. VIII (barring excessive fines and cruel and
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Lastly, high decision costs should be detached from the idea of "more
process." For the most part these values move in the same direction, but not
always. Occasionally the solution to decision costs is changing the process in a
way that makes it more resource intensive. Take delay. It might be that delayed
decisions are the consequence of insufficient resources to complete all
decisions on the agenda, and that additional resources will eliminate the delay
at an acceptable cost to taxpayers and beneficiaries. The complaint rests on
intolerable decision costs (delay), yet the remedy might be labeled "more
process" (additional decisionmakers). This Article uses "undue process" as a
broad term of art. It includes objections to decision costs of any kind, based on
either the burden imposed on particular parties or globally, and successful
objections need not dictate a protocol more streamlined than the status quo.
The relevant phenomena should be clearer now. Government decisions are
choices that alter the status quo. Their significance can be measured by the area
they cover, their intended duration, and their resilience to change. Each
decision arises out of a process, which requires a decisionmaker and an agenda,
and which might include third-party participation, information gathering, and
deliberation. All of this generates decision costs. Decision costs are likewise a
function of voting rules in multimember bodies, the character of any law
governing the decision, and the dynamic implications of these factors over
time.
Finally, it is apparent yet worth stressing that decision costs are impossible
to evaluate normatively without understanding their sources and consequences.
This can only be done with reference to the goal of a decision and the trade-offs
of shifting to an alternative process. The causes of decision costs are not
inherently good or bad, nor would any sensible person want decision costs to be
immeasurably low or infinitely high. But the judgments in between can be
vigorously contested. To keep the inquiry inclusive, constitutional law ought to
be investigated for any downward pressure it puts on decision costs, even if a
net gain is unclear.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL READINGS
If forced to characterize the U.S. Constitution as generally imposing either
floors or ceilings on decision costs, the answer will come easily for many. Not
without reason. Our constitutional text seems to be bursting with procedural
mandates-from the announcement in Article I, Section 2 that House elections
must be held biennially to the delayed implementation of congressional salary
changes in the Twenty-Seventh Amendment. A careful review of federal
unusual punishment); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003)
(limiting punitive damages); cf U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (prescribing removal upon
impeachment for certain misconduct). Penalties will not be an issue in this study.
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constitutional law, however, uncovers a concern about decision costs. The
following pages identify the best candidates for undue process claims. But
before conducting that search, which draws on ground-level inquiries into
isolated pockets of constitutional law and practice, it is worth setting the sights
much higher.
A. The Whole Text
In a crucial sense, the entire Constitution limits decision costs. This is not a
characterization of the document's content or an assertion about the
understandings of past generations who proposed and ratified the bits of text
that make up the document. It is a descriptive claim about the use of
constitutional text today, and a supposition about the primary value of that text.
1. Focal points
People in this country, as a matter of fact, refer to the U.S. Constitution in
order to limit if not resolve issues. Insofar as issues are shaped or concluded
with reference to the text, decision costs can be reduced compared to a state of
the world in which no such text exists. The supremacy of this text, declared in
Article VI and confirmed by much subsequent practice, supports this
conclusion. Other sources of law might inform our understanding of the
document but we may rely on its meaning to trump those sources and end
inquiries. For at least some part of the Constitution, moreover, the reduction in
decision costs is worth the inability to more easily respond to contemporary
preferences.
Students of indeterminacy in constitutional law might be uncomfortable
with these claims at first, but they should not be very controversial. The
supremacy of the federal constitutional text attracts discussion only rarely, and
the document is subject to only so many understandings. Much constitutional
text is relatively open-ended, without question. Moreover, extracting meaning
from the document requires choices regarding interpretive method that are
themselves contested.79 The most dogmatic arguments against meaning in texts
are, however, unsatisfying. Extravagant postmodern claims about radical
indeterminacy always had the unfortunate quality of disproving themselves just
insofar as the claims were intelligible. And even if there is no singular objective
meaning to a text that is external to a given reader, groups can nevertheless
develop agreement on the outer boundary of textual meaning. Sophisticated
79. Cf Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of
Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REv. 231, 232, 247-56 & n.86 (discussing coordination by
plain-meaning statutory interpretation, at least for cases that are "real dogs"); Adrian
Vermeule, The Judiciary Is a They Not an It: Interpretive Theory and the Fallacy of
Division, 14 J. CoNTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 549, 571-72 (2005) (pointing out distributional
consequences of interpretive methods, which might undercut coordination desires).
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critical scholars are quite able to acknowledge this. 80 Within the area of this
social agreement on meaning, or at least the boundaries of possible meaning,
debate is unnecessary and decision costs can be economized.
A particular agreement about textual meaning could be bad or derived from
a morally suboptimal process, but neither undercuts the dispute-minimizing
function of the document insofar as its readers come to widespread accord. Nor
do we need to understand the precise mechanisms by which the U.S.
Constitution achieved or maintains its status as supreme and worthy of respect.
That written constitutions can be largely immaterial (Uzbekistan), and that
unwritten constitutional conventions can constrain equally well (England),
undercut the sufficiency and necessity of writings as tools of constraint without
demonstrating their irrelevance.
It is admittedly difficult to ascertain the degree to which our use of the
document controls outcomes and reduces decision costs. Certain disputes might
be less costly to resolve without textual fidelity, which is probably increasingly
true as the document ages. The clause requiring Presidents to be "natural born
citizen[s]" might be an illustration,81 compared to a situation in which voters
have the freedom to decide whether this matters (whatever it means). In
addition, much of what the constitutional text suggests might now occur
because of status quo bias, persisting ideological preferences, or even physical
architecture. Whether bicameralism would have survived in the absence of a
supreme and entrenched Article I is an almost impossible counterfactual
inquiry. At the same time, these are surely questions of degree alone. The text
was useful in announcing an agreement and initiating government practices,
regardless of other forces carrying them forward, and even today debates are
tied up with constitutional text. Judges, elected officials, and others use the
document to frame discussions and invigorate their arguments. So the text
seems to matter.
82
80. Ely's observation that "it's a very bad lawyer who supposes that manipulability
and infinite manipulability are the same thing," JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 112 (1980), is not far from the sentiment of, for
example, DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (FIN DE SIECLE) 60 (1997) ("[1]n
many cases in which the ideological stakes are high, legal actors have had a choice between
two (or more) interpretations or definitions of a particular rule .... "), Jack M. Balkin,
Deconstruction's Legal Career, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 719, 734 (2005) (noting that
deconstruction as exercised in legal contexts should have suggested that "social construction
placed constraints on legal decisionmaking and helped produce the internal sense in lawyers
and judges that some arguments were better than others"), and Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal
Theory (Without Modifiers) in the United States, 13 J. POL. PHIL. 99, 108 (2005) ("As critical
legal studies developed, bold and overstated claims that all results were underdetermined
were replaced by more defensible ones .... ). A concise recap of the crits on constitutional
law is Louis M. Seidman, Critical Constitutionalism Now, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 575 (2006).
81. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5; see Charles Gordon, Who Can Be President of the
United States: The Unresolved Enigma, 28 MD. L. REV. 1, 1 (1968) (noting Barry
Goldwater's territorial birth).
82. See I LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 35-39 (3d ed. 2000)
[Vol. 59:601
HeinOnline  -- 59 Stan. L. Rev. 622 2006-2007
UNDUE PROCESS
To an extent, then, our constitutional text is a focal point for resolving or
confining disputes. The notion is familiar from game theory, in which it may
explain how certain coordination problems are solved.83 Thomas Schelling's
famous example was a decision about where and when to meet in New York
City. If the participants cannot communicate and have only one shot to
individually select a location and time of day, the set of possible choices is so
large that a meeting might seem hopeless. But some solutions were more
salient than others to Schelling's respondents, especially if each participant
thought about what their counterpart would think. An outright majority of
Schelling's (New Haven) respondents chose Grand Central Station and another
large majority chose noon.84
Among others, David Strauss has characterized the Federal Constitution as
a kind of focal point. His insight was that a focal point theory could help
overcome the dead-band problem in constitutional law. 85 The problem is that
most of the words contained in the written constitution were drafted and ratified
before any of us were bom and by people who are now deceased. That there are
not more or different words to interpret is mainly the consequence of the same
cross-generational obedience: our decision to abide by Article V, governing
amendments, which was also put in place by dead people. They operated under
conditions and with preferences that differ radically from today's. In a modem
liberal democracy, insofar as the well-being of each person counts and dead
people do not, a persuasive reason for abiding by the text is hard to come by.
For example, actual consent of the living seems like a nonstarter under present
circumstances if the concept has much meaning, 86 and the document's content
is not perfect. After all, a vice president has a plausible textual argument under
Article I, Section 3 for presiding at his or her own impeachment trial. 87
(taking the text as authoritative and foreclosing readings "contrary" to it); Strauss, supra note
19, at 1747 ("[E]veryone thinks the words of the Constitution should count for something.");
see also H. JEFFERSON POWELL, A COMMUNITY BUILT ON WORDS: THE CONSTITUTION IN
HISTORY AND POLITICS 6 (2002).
83. See, e.g., DAVID LEWIS, CONVENTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY 35-36 (1969);
THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 54-58 (1963); Richard H. McAdams, A
Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1658-63 (2000).
84. See SCHELLING, supra note 83, at 55 n. 1, 56.
85. Strauss, supra note 19, at 1733-35; David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional
Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 907-11 (1996); accord Sunstein, supra note 77, at
638-39, 642 (exploring the removal of issues from ordinary politics by constitutional
entrenchment); see also Barak Cohen, Empowering Constitutionalism with Text from an
Israeli Perspective, 18 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 585, 613-15 (2003).
86. See RANDY BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION 30-31 (2004); Paul
Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 226
(1980).
87. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Someone Should Have Told Spiro Agnew, in
CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES 75, 75-76 (William N. Eskridge,
Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds., 1998).
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A focal point theory begins to sidestep these difficulties. Reference to a
written constitution will resolve and confine some disputes if enough people
expect the reference, regardless of the document's pedigree or theoretical
legitimacy. A resulting drop in decision costs is worth celebrating. In this
respect, the U.S. Constitution might be the Grand Central Station of dispute
resolution for questions of government operation. In fact, the document
includes a provision that solves half of Schelling's coordination exercise:
although it does not tell us where Congress is supposed to assemble, the text
does establish a default time. 88 The particular date is far less important than the
uncertainty and disagreement it avoids. This dispute-reducing characterization
of the text might be particularly apt, considering Article VI supremacy and the
difficulty of formal amendment. Such resilience means that the text sticks until
an overwhelming agreement can be reached within the relevant institutions.
The argument is easily extended to Supreme Court judgments in
constitutional cases.8 9 That the Court has asserted its own supremacy in the
interpretation of the U.S. Constitution90 should make little difference.
Nevertheless, other government officials do abide by the Court's judgments; 9 1
even Richard Nixon turned over his oval office recordings when so ordered.
Federal courts are not always the most likely to provide correct answers to
constitutional questions, of course, but that is not the test of whether judicial
supremacy is a net positive development. Over the long run and compared to
the alternatives, respecting the judgment of federal courts is defensible and
entrenched practice. It is not necessary to include judicial judgments before the
benefits of dispute reduction are enjoyed, however. Our use of the text by itself
serves that end. This is sometimes easy to forget because the klieg lights of
litigation are so often shut off in this context. At its most effective, the
Constitution's role in dispute resolution is invisible.
2. Empirical inquiries
For all its advantages, the focal point function of constitutional text raises
vexing questions. If the text actually constrains real-world operations, there
remain issues of proportion. How much constitutional law solves pure
coordination problems with rules to which no sane person attaches normative
88. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 (the first Monday of every December, unless altered by
statute), superseded by U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 2 (noon every January 3, unless altered by
statute).
89. See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional
Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REv. 1359, 1380-81 (1997); see also Thomas W. Merrill,
Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations for Judgments, 15 CARDOZO L. REv.
43, 43-45 (1993) (distinguishing judgments from holdings and opinions).
90. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
91. See Daniel A. Farber, The Importance of Being Final, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 359,
364 (2003).
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significance? How much of it covers (badly named) battle-of-the-sexes
situations, where participants do prefer particular outcomes over others but
prefer lack of agreement least of all?92 All else equal, the more important
constitutional law is to social well-being now, the less willing a country might
be to adhere to its strictures when they conflict with today's needs and desires.
One response is to eliminate tension by opening room for contemporary
choice. It might be that text and conventional interpretive methods fade for
issues considered important by present-day participants. 93 Disputants will still
have reason to show how their position can be adopted without doing violence
to text and standard methods of interpretation, but resolution of the matter will
not be dictated by those sources. If true, this observation ameliorates the dead-
hand problem by jettisoning the focal point function, rather than abiding by it.
The system would be sacrificing the ability of text and interpretation to save
decision costs in perhaps every significant dispute.
A second response comes from another direction. One might conclude that
our constitutional text actually covers few significant disputes and is good for
little other than dispute minimization. We could then save the decision costs
involved in fighting it, and the transition costs of change that has no sure value.
Available numbers might disturb a legal scholar. Empirical work over the last
twenty years suggests a variety of constitutional choices that have little or no
measurable impact on social well-being. Past findings must be treated with
care, of course. This field of rigorous statistical inquiry into whether and how
constitutions matter is still developing, with important opportunities created by
widespread constitutional change following the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Occasionally the studies do not distinguish mere legal declarations from actual
influence on social practices, or incorporate controversial choices about which
sorts of well-being count. But the work done so far is suggestive. Much of what
legal scholars and judges wrestle with might amount to insignificant squabbles,
with case-specific distributive consequences at most.
Democracies and dictatorships. One long-running debate concerns the
relationship to economic development of the choice between democracy and
authoritarianism. Scholarly opinion shifted and divided over the years. 94 A
particularly sophisticated investigation is the statistical study of 135 nations
between 1950 and 1990 by Adam Przeworski and his co-authors. Although the
patterns of economic growth diverge in wealthier countries-where
democracies begin to use and benefit from economic inputs differently from
dictatorships-the authors conclude that these two government forms do not
appear to otherwise affect economic development. Democracies do tend to
have higher per capita GDP growth. But, they contend, this is because
92. See McAdams, supra note 83, at 1673 & n.56.
93. See Strauss, supra note 19, at 1743.
94. See Adam Przeworski & Fernando Limongi, Political Regimes and Economic
Growth, J. EcoN. PERSP., Summer 1993, at 51, 60-61 (collecting sources).
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dictatorships experience faster labor-force growth. 95 The principal goal in
studies of this sort is to question the necessity of authoritarianism for the
economic development of poor countries, but the results are useful beyond that.
Democratic institutional design. If democracy in general lacks a clear
advantage over dictatorship in growing national income, one cannot expect
dramatic effects from every institutional design choice within democracies.
Xavier de Vanssay and Z.A. Spindler studied one hundred countries using
cross-sectional data from before the collapse of the Soviet Union. Their
regressions indicated no significant effect on per capita GDP from certain
entrenched constitutional attributes. The authors used dummy variables for
these attributes but they swept widely, including bicameralism, federalism, and
a supreme court with some scope of constitutional review.96 Vanssay and
Spindler did find a positive and significant effect from being "a federation" as
opposed to "a unitary state," but only for OECD countries. 97 The results also
seem mixed when the dependent variable is spending. A simple study from the
1980s found no significant effect on government spending in U.S. states and
local governments from borrowing limits, tax or spending limits, line-item veto
powers, or gubernatorial term limits.
9 8
Rights, negative and positive. Doubts have been voiced about the positive
impact of rights provisions, as well. The Vanssay and Spindler study tested a
list of constitutional rights provisions, including privacy, religious liberty, and
social welfare guarantees, such as the right to an education, medical care,
housing, and social security. Again the effect on per capita GDP does not
95. See ADAM PRZEWORSKI ET AL., DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT: POLITICAL
INSTITUTIONS AND WELL-BEING IN THE WORLD, 1950-1990, at 142, 166-67, 178-79 (2000).
For a nice statement of difficulties in this field, including endogeneity, see Adam
Przeworski, Institutions Matter?, 39 GOV'T & OPPOSITION 527 (2004).
96. Xavier de Vanssay & Z.A. Spindler, Freedom and Growth: Do Constitutions
Matter?, 78 PUB. CHOICE 359, 365-66 (1994) (finding effects from the savings/investment
rate, educational achievement, an index of "economic freedom," and population growth, the
last of which was inversely related to per capita GDP).
97. See id. at 363, 365; cf JAN-ERIK LANE, CONSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL THEORY
208-09 (1996) (studying OECD countries and finding little connection between economic
outcomes and democratic institutional design, though corporatist regimes seem to have high
incomes and transfer payments); John Gerring et al., Centripetal Democratic Governance: A
Theory and Global Inquiry, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 567, 575-79 (2005) (asserting some
positive effect from more centralized and "inclusive" arrangements in democracies across a
variety of outcomes, including per capita GDP).
98. See Burton A. Abrams & William R. Dougan, The Effects of Constitutional
Restraints on Government Spending, 49 PUB. CHOICE 101, 112-13 (1986) (cross-sectional
analysis finding a relationship with increasing severance tax capacity or median income, for
example). Abrams and Dougan did find a link between line-item vetoes and state-level
spending. But the relationship was positive and it disappeared when state and local spending
were aggregated. See id. at 112. For contrasting results, see Niclas Berggren & Peter Kurrild-
Klitgaard, Economic Effects of Political Institutions, with Special Reference to Constitutions,
in WHY CONSTITUTIONS MATTER 167, 191 (Niclas Berggren et al. eds., 2002) (collecting
three studies).
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appear to be statistically significant.99 Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer present
similar conclusions in a study of average annual per capita GDP growth from
1974 to 1989. One independent variable they tested was an average combined
score for civil and political liberties based on Freedom House's indexes from
1973 to 1986. They found no significant relationship to growth.' 00
Rights and the disadvantaged. Some might believe that individualistic
rights adversely impact social equality. Such rights, like a vibrant takings
clause, might activate judicial interference or a cultural orientation that thwarts
equitable wealth distribution. Frank Cross recently attempted a first-cut test of
these suggestions with a simple cross-sectional study of several economically
developed Western nations. His regressions do not show a statistically
significant effect from bills of rights and judicial review on poverty, either
absolute or relative, although he does find a significant increase in transfer
payments to the poor in countries with a bill of rights.' 0 ' Cross's study is
framed as a rebuttal of Ran Hirschl's provocative examination of constitutional
judicial review in Canada, Israel, New Zealand, and South Africa. But the
contrast is not terribly sharp. One of Hirschl s central empirical claims is that
the constitutionalization of rights in these countries "has achieved little or no
real change in arenas such as wealth redistribution, minority political
representation, and the equalization of life conditions."
10 2
Caveats are in order. Some constitutional choices certainly matter,
according to the values of nearly everyone. The best known observation on this
score is Amartya Sen's regarding famine as a product of political failure. He
claims that, at least since World War II, no famine has occurred in a multiparty
99. See Vanssay & Spindler, supra note 96, at 364 (getting a negative sign for bills of
rights). One barrier to an effect from social welfare "rights" might be that courts are reluctant
to enforce them even when these duties appear in constitutional text. See Helen Hershkoff,
Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112
HARV. L. REv. 1131, 1136 (1999); Mark Tushnet, Social Welfare Rights and the Forms of
Judicial Review, 82 TEX. L. REv. 1895, 1900-09 (2004) (exploring variations in judicial
intervention, including South Africa's soft version).
100. See Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, Institutions and Economic Performance:
Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures, 7 ECON. & POL. 207, 210,
215, 219-20, 226 (1995). But cf Gerald W. Scully, The Institutional Framework and
Economic Development, 96 J. POL. ECON. 652, 655-68 & n.3 (1988) (finding a link to GDP
growth from 1960-1980, but using Freedom House indexes for 1973-1980 and converting
them into dummy variables representing high and low ends of the scales).
101. See Frank B. Cross, The Liberal Assault on the Constitution (Jan. 2006),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstractid 883113. Corporatism (as opposed to pluralism)
seems related to higher absolute poverty rates, but the samples for Cross's poverty data are
small (n = 9 to 15). See id. at 23.
102. RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE
NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 151 (2004). Hirschl does state that the rights in question are
"associated with precisely the opposite ethos,. . . planting the seeds for greater, not lesser,
disparity in essential life conditions." Id Note that three of Hirschl's four nations are not
included in Cross's study. See Cross, supra note 101, at 23.
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democracy with elections and a free media. 10 3 Insofar as the connection is
causal, we have excellent reason to support basic democratic norms, even if
there is disagreement about whether democracy could spur economic growth or
should be used to fashion public-spirited citizens. Furthermore, several studies
indicate effective protection of property rights, long-term contracts, and other
market elements help with economic prosperity. 104 Some of these are
protected, at least qualifiedly, with constitutional law and judicial review.
Finally, it could be that judicial independence and constitutional judicial review
have a positive effectl° -although that result surely depends on the substance
of judicial judgments, and it remains unclear exactly what those judgments
should include.'
0 6
In any event, empirical studies cannot determine which dependent
variables are normatively significant or are priorities. Many studies are fixated
on GDP, an available number reported with relative accuracy. This is only one
proxy for human well-being. Income disparity, health, environmental quality,
and knowledge might be concerns, to take a few examples. So, too, for self-
expression and sex equality in many wealthy nations, or the desire to integrate a
particular church doctrine with state operations in various parts of the world.
Some of these standards for well-being are not easily measured, making
regressions difficult to run. Other standards might be measurable but reflect a
103. See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 51-52 (1999) ("[F]amines are
extremely easy to prevent if the government tries to prevent them .... ); id. at 178-88
(counting Botswana and Zimbabwe as democracies, along with India, to claim that the
observation holds for economically poor democracies); see also PRZEWORSKI ET AL., supra
note 95, at 228 (finding life expectancy is longer in democracies, across national per capita
income bands); Thomas D. Zweifel & Patricio Navia, Democracy, Dictatorship, and Infant
Mortality, 11 J. DEMOCRACY, Apr. 2000, at 99 (asserting democracies have lower infant
mortality rates at every level of per capita GDP). But see Michael Ross, Is Democracy Good
for the Poor?, 50 AM. J. POL. Sci. 860, 860, 863-68, 871-72 (2006) (finding-based on some
imputed values-democracies spend more money on public services but democracy has
"little or no effect on infant and child mortality" if more countries are added to the dataset).
104. See, e.g., Ronald J. Daniles & Michael J. Trebilcock, The Political Economy of
Rule of Law Reform in Developing Countries, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 99, 100-04 (2004)
(collecting sources); Vanssay & Spindler, supra note 96, at 364; Wenbo Wu & Otto A.
Davis, The Two Freedoms, Economic Growth and Development: An Empirical Study, 100
PUB. CHOICE 39, 57 (1999) (using panel data for about one hundred countries).
105. See Lars P. Feld & Stefan Voigt, Judicial Independence and Economic Growth:
Some Proposals Regarding the Judiciary, in DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND
PUBLIC POLICY: ANALYSIS AND EVIDENCE 251, 281 (Roger D. Congleton & Birgitta
Swedenborg eds., 2006); Rafael LaPorta et al., Judicial Checks and Balances, 112 J. POL.
ECON. 445, 448-55 (2004) (exploring the connection to economic and political freedom).
106. It also appears that countries with long constitutions are in trouble. See Alvaro A.
Montenegro, Constitutional Design and Economic Performance, 6 CONST. POL. ECON. 161,
166-68 (1995) (measuring constitutional length by the number of "permanent articles" and
suggesting an inverse correlation with per capita GDP in 1988 or thereabout). But any causal
arrow is surely running from the nation's problems to the document's length. See id
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social-justice-based conclusion that some norms are inherently valuable,
making any instrumental benefit less relevant.
10 7
Yet uncertainty can elevate the importance of constitutional text and
conventional interpretive method. These sources of meaning ought to guide
constitutional choices more forcefully when we are less confident that the
choice will make a difference. 108 We certainly could do worse than our present
Constitution; the issue is how confident we are that substantial improvement
could be achieved by change. Three houses. of Congress would probably be
worse than two. But the optimal number is unknown and possibly closer to
zero. In such cases we can save the costs of creative decision making and
transition based on hunches.
B. The Parts Elaborated
The dispute-reducing functions of constitutional text, interpretive method,
and judicial judgments reveal nothing about the specific content of federal
constitutional law. And the message of the component parts need not reflect the
principal function of the system. So far we have reason to believe that the U.S.
Constitution and its conventional interpretation reduce decision costs compared
to a universe without them, but we do not know if injunctions to cut such costs
are embedded within enforceable provisions.
1. Cross-cutting norms
Mainstream impressions of the Constitution tend to reflect the minimum
process it requires, not the additional process it forbids. Procedural floors are
certainly easy to locate. Consider the protocols for generating positive law. The
institutions and procedures involved in Article I, Section 7 legislation and
Article V amendment are elaborate, with bicameralism only one of many
roadblocks. Of equal significance, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
guarantee "due process of law" before federal or state governments may
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property. These provisions cover a wide
range of private losses and are not expressly limited to a subset of government
actors. 109 Nor do courts restrict their review to whether officials abide by the
107. Cf AMARTYA SEN, COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES 19 (2d ed. 1999)
(distinguishing well-being from economic wealth); Martha Nussbaum, Beyond the Social
Contract: Capabilities and Social Justice, in THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF
COSMOPOLITANISM 196, 210 (Gillian Brock & Harry Brighouse eds., 2005) (stressing
outcomes, as in "a list of entitlements that have to be secured to citizens, if the society in
question is a minimally just one" where people are capable of "fully human living").
108. 1 mean a difference to society at large, not simply the short-term interests of
litigants, and when uncertainty about better outcomes is difficult to eliminate.
109. The Supreme Court has been unwilling to mandate individualized participation in
general rulemaking processes, however. See Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Coils. v. Knight, 465
U.S. 271, 283, 285 (1984) ("The Constitution does not grant to members of the public
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process secured in ordinary law. It is settled, as much as any point of
constitutional law can be, that Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment deprivations
ordinarily should be tested against what process is constitutionally "due" under
the circumstances and with at least a measure of independent judicial
judgment. 110 In addition, a special set of procedural guarantees applies in
criminal matters, with a laundry list of constraints in the Fourth through Sixth
Amendments.
Finding a comparable message of procedural parsimony is more difficult or
at least counterintuitive. The very idea of constitutionally mandated ceilings on
government process can seem bizarre, evidenced by the Stroud Township
litigation. There the developer claimed that township officials, with knowledge
of the expiration date on the developer's tax credits, intentionally delayed
processing the development plan to prevent low-income housing from being
built. To characterize this claim, the lawyers and courts landed on the label
"substantive due process." The developer's argument had nothing to do with
skirting a conventional line between process and substance. The claim was
emphatically about the process of government decision making; it is just that
the objection was to interminable rather than inadequate process. Of course the
developer was attempting to protect an economic interest, and it was required
to convince the courts that this (substantive) interest was entitled to
constitutional respect."' But this is also true when a party demands additional
process, such as a hearing, to satisfy the requirements of "procedural due
process."' 112 Insofar as substantive due process is a catchall label for
unorthodox constitutional challenges, it might fit here. But it remains a
misnomer and an indication that undue process objections are not considered
mainstream.
Is the disparate salience of due and undue process well-grounded? Undue
process sympathizers could assert that the spirit of the Constitution
encompasses an active, albeit restrained, national government. Focusing on the
trajectory leading to the original document gives this argument a little traction.
Without question, advocates of the 1789 Constitution believed that the Articles
generally a right to be heard by public bodies making decisions of policy .... Not least
among the reasons for refusing to recognize such a right is the impossibility of its judicial
definition and enforcement."); Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S.
441, 445 (1915) ("Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people it is
impracticable that everyone should have a direct voice in its adoption .... Their rights are
protected in the only way that they can be in a complex society, by their power, immediate
or remote, over those who make the rule.").
110. See Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.)
272, 276 (1856).
111. See Woodwind Estates, Ltd. v. Gretkowski, 205 F.3d 118, 123 (3d Cir. 2000)
(finding a protected property interest where the developer's plan "indisputably satisfied all of
the requirements for approval under the ordinance," which "substantially limit[ed]" the
township's discretion to disapprove).
112. See, e.g., Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 59 (1999).
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of Confederation hobbled national success by leaving too much authority in the
separate states. One target was a form of supermajority voting rule: under the
Articles, Congress needed the assistance of each state to carry out its domestic
orders, including requisitions. 113 The 1789 Constitution, for all its procedural
mandates, was also a referendum on national efficacy through a degree of
centralization. As such, and compared to what came before, the Constitution
might encompass some of the intuitions behind undue process objections.
Contrast the written constitutional movements that followed the disintegration
of the Soviet Union. In a sense, they moved in the opposite direction.
Complaints about the Soviet government were not much a question of
excessive weakness or veto gates within its structure. 
114
That said, the document's trajectory is a weak basis for manufacturing a
cross-cutting undue process norm, at least if the commitment to textualism and
conventional interpretive method is retained. There seems to be a hole in the
text. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments make a commitment to due process
without clearly encouraging undue process objections. The hole becomes more
visible after state constitutions are examined. They do not include the broadest
possible undue process dictate-for example, one that would cap decision costs
in a given dispute regardless of the parties' demands for process. But they do
appear to go further than the federal text. In fact, one of the more popular state
constitutional provisions promises speedy and inexpensive justice, not only in
criminal matters but also for civil litigation and possibly more. New
Hampshire's provision is typical:
Every subject of this state is entitled to a certain remedy, by having recourse to
the laws, for all injuries he may receive in his person, property, or character; to
obtain right and justice freely, without being obliged to purchase it;
completely, and without any denial; promptly, and without delay; conformably
to the laws. 1
15
113. See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 28 (2d ed. 2005).
114. See, e.g., Joel C. Moses, Democratic Reform in the Gorbachev Era: Dimensions
of Reform in the Soviet Union, 1986-1989, 48 RUSSIAN REV. 235, 235-36 (1989).
115. N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 14; see also ALA. CONST. § 13; ARIZ. CONST. art. 1, § 11;
ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 13; COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 6; CONN. CONST. art I, § 10; DEL. DECL. OF
RTS. § 12; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 9; FLA. CONST. art. II, § 21; IDAHO CONST. art. 1, § 18; ILL.
CONST. art. I, § 12; IND. CONST. art. 1, § 12; KAN. BILL OF RTS. § 18; Ky. CONST. § 14; LA.
CONST. art. 1, § 22; ME. CONST. art. I, § 19; MD. CONST. art. 19; MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. XI;
MINN. CONST. art. I, § 8; MISS. CONST. art. 3, § 24; MO. CONST. art. 1, § 14; MONT. CONST.
art. I1, § 16; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 13; N.Y. Civ. RTs. LAW ch. 6, art. 2, § 10; N.C. CONST. art
1, § 18; OHIO CONST. art 1, § 16; OR. CONST. art I, § 10; PA. CONST. art 1, § 1; R.I. CONST.
art. 1, § 5; S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 9; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 20; TENN. CONST. art. 1 § 17; UTAH
CONST. art. 1, § 11; VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. 4; WASH. CONST. art 1, § 10; W.V. CONST. art 3, §
17; WIS. CONST. art. 1, § 9; WYO. CONST. art 1, § 8; cf GA. CONST. art. VI, § IX, I ("[T]he
Supreme Court shall... by order adopt and publish uniform court rules and record-keeping
rules which shall provide for the speedy, efficient, and inexpensive resolution of disputes
and prosecutions.").
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Some scholars have been excited by the first part of these provisions,
creating rights to remedies, without paying much attention to the last half.
1 16
The reference to prompt, speedy, and corruption-free justice is more intriguing
for present purposes. It suggests a commitment to a type of undue process
norm, one that receives occasional recognition in state courts. 
17
There is nothing new about these state constitutional provisions, either.
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Delaware adopted versions
before the Federal Constitution was even drafted. 118 And the basic idea was
modeled on a more ancient source. Over five-hundred years earlier, the first
edition of the Magna Carta promised:
39. No free man shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or outlawed or
exiled or in any way ruined, nor will we go or send against him, except by the
lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.
40. To no one will we sell, to no one will we deny or delay right or justice.
116. See, e.g., Jennifer Friesen, Recovering Damages for State Bills of Rights Claims,
63 TEX. L. REv. 1269, 1296 (1985). For an illuminating historical inquiry into the remedy
sections of these clauses, see John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law, 115
YALE L.J. 524, 565 (2005).
117. Successful claims include People ex rel. Christiansen v. Connell, 118 N.E.2d 262,
265-69 (Ill. 1954) (invalidating a qualified statutory sixty-day waiting period before filing
for divorce), Maury County v. Porter, 257 S.W.2d 16, 17 (Tenn. 1953) (invalidating a
statutory bar on eminent domain compensation trials until one year after highway
completion), and Werner v. Milwaukee Solvay Coke Co., 31 N.W.2d 605, 606 (Wis. 1948)
(holding that the trial court had a duty to rule, pre-trial, on the constitutionality of the Portal-
to-Portal Act, which purported to foreclose liability). Cf Kristanik v. Chevrolet Motor Co.,
70 S.W.2d 890, 893-94 (Mo. 1934) (construing a statute to permit reviewing courts to order,
without rehearing, payment of certain worker's compensation claims). But many early
claims attacked court filing fees and the like, and were largely unsuccessful. See, e.g., Perce
v. Hallett, 13 R.I. 363, 365 (1881) (concluding that the constitutional provision does not
forbid fixed court fees to raise revenue but rather "gratuities, or exactions, given or
demanded for the direct purpose of influencing the course of legal proceedings"); A.E. DICK
HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE: MAGNA CARTA AND CONSTITUTIONALISM tN
AMERICA 285-89 (1968) (noting a few victories in probate and as applied to an indigent
litigant); see also Irish v. Gimbel, 691 A.2d 664, 672 (Me. 1997) (upholding medical
malpractice screening panels, despite delay caused mainly by discovery); Rochell v. City of
Florence, 182 So. 50, 51 (Ala. 1938) (upholding a statute requiring a hearing and twenty-
four hour notice to a municipality before an ordinance is temporarily restrained).
118. See DEL. DECL. OF RTS. § 12 (1776); MD. CONST. art. XVII (1776); MASS. CONST.
pt. I, art. XI (1780); N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 14 (1784); see also Hans A. Linde, Without "Due
Process": Unconstitutional Law in Oregon, 49 OR. L. REv. 125, 137-38 (1970) (separating
the heritage of state remedies clauses from due process guarantees).
119. MAGNA CARTA chs. 39-40 (1215), reprinted in J.C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 461 (2d
ed. 1992); see also HOWARD, supra note 117, at 284-85 (connecting the final sentence to
state constitutions). For Coke's paraphrasing, which is like the state constitutional
provisions, see SIR EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 55-56 (London, M. Flesher & R. Young, 6th ed. 1681) ("[F]reely without sale,
fully without any denial, and speedily without delay."); id. at 56 (claiming "right" meant
"law").
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This was part of the English barony's effort to extract concessions from
King John after a series of costly military campaigns, and it was a reaction to
corruption and extortion in the royal courts. Litigation sometimes stalled for no
reason other than selfish official whim, moved ahead only after the parties
anted up something extra, or devolved into bidding wars among disputants.
This might not seem so awful in a society with trial-by-battle. But it was a
system that nevertheless irked the elites who demanded reform. 120 As a
consequence, Blackstone could conclude in 1768 that "any delay in the
granting [of the royal writs], or setting an unusual or exorbitant price upon
them, would be a breach" of the Great Charter. 
121
The notion could not have been lost on those who ratified the original U.S.
Constitution and brought about its first amendments. Early in 1788, The
Federal Fanner criticized the original document for not enumerating additional
rights in federal judicial proceedings, including an entitlement "to obtain right
and justice freely and without delay."' 122 Later that year, the ratification
convention in James Madison's own Commonwealth of Virginia recommended
amendments. One of them was a replica of the state constitutional provision
quoted above. 123 The North Carolina convention proposed essentially the same
amendment, although that state failed to ratify until a second convention in
1789.124 Such clauses admittedly join a right to civil remedies with a right to
speedy, inexpensive, and corruption-free justice; perhaps the former was
rejected and not the latter. But it remains notable that no such specific language
made its way into the Constitution.
Given this background, the Due Process Clauses are less likely to
underwrite objections to decision costs in general, or perhaps even privately
suffered process burdens. These provisions forbid certain "depriv[ations]" from
persons "without due" process. That phrasing can fairly be read as a guaranteed
floor, or a series thereof, not a ceiling. Thus when A sues B for possession of
property, A might demand a hearing to present her evidence, B might do
likewise, and the court might invoke due process to ensure that the proceedings
fairly incorporate the accuracy and participation interests of both sides; but
neither A nor B could raise a constitutional objection to a hearing for the other,
120. See HOLT, supra note 119, at 106-08, 149-53, 164-65.
121. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 64, at *274.
122. Letters from the Federal Farmer No. 16 (Jan. 20, 1788), reprinted in 2 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 323, 328 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (listing "law of the
land" language separately).
123. See Amendments Proposed by the Virginia Convention (June 27, 1788), reprinted
in EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 181, 184 (1957).
Virginia called for speed in habeas corpus, too. See id. at 184; see also Amendments
Proposed by the New York Convention (July 26, 1788), reprinted in DUMBAULD, supra, at
189, 190 (similar).
124. See Amendments Proposed by the North Carolina Convention (Aug. 1, 1788),
reprinted in DUMBAULD, supra note 123, at 200; FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 113, at 308
tbl.7.1.
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nor could the court use due process norms to limit overall decision costs
stemming from such procedural protections. Similar logic applies when a single
party requests a license or other benefit from a government official. On this
interpretation, moreover, the central notion of due process might track the
distinction between decision costs and error costs: the relevant deprivations
appear to be consequences of a government decision, not the process leading up
to it. The Magna Carta and state constitutions are written differently. They
point to right and justice, and they promise to reach that outcome without
purchase or delay. The disjuncture of state and federal constitutional text does
not seem to have an accepted historical explanation, but the anti-undue process
interpretation could fit with the context of the founding era and even
Reconstruction. Perhaps the population of 1791 was more comfortable
endorsing guarantees of swift and inexpensive action at the state level, a kind of
guarantee that might have clashed with remaining skepticism about a major
expansion of central government activity. 125 Analogous skepticism about state-
level action accompanied the post-Civil War Amendments.
There remain serious complications in the argument, however. It is still
possible to extract undue process restraints from the Due Process Clauses. The
possibility arises in part because of the incorporation doctrine, by which the
Supreme Court has applied concepts from the Bill of Rights against the states.
Some of the imported concepts have undue process attributes, like the right to a
speedy trial 126 and the prohibition of double jeopardy.' 2 7 If the idea of "due
process" cannot include restrictions on decision costs of any sort, then the
application of these guarantees against the states would be foreclosed. The
Court has held otherwise, even though it creates an arguable redundancy
between the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause and other provisions in
the Bill of Rights. These holdings open the possibility of a broader undue
process norm, which could find support, rather than defeat, in the tradition of
the Magna Carta and state constitutional law.' 2 8 More generally, the judicial
history of the Due Process Clauses is marked by flexibility. Those provisions
have been cited to legitimize court theories of vested rights, opposition to
retroactive lawmaking, limits on "taking from A and giving to B," requirements
of decisionmaker impartiality, and restrictions on personal jurisdiction over
out-of-state defendants' 29 -not to mention the most controversial instances of
substantive due process) 30 The demand for notice and an opportunity to be
125. Cf Linde, supra note 118, at 138 n.38 (discussing right-to-remedy clauses).
126. See Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 US. 213, 222-26 (1967).
127. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794-96 (1969).
128. Cf Klopfer, 386 U.S. at 223 (linking speedy criminal trial rights to the Magna
Carta). Using a more flexible textual hook, like the Privileges or Immunities Clause, might
strengthen the argument.
129. See, e.g., JOHN V. ORTH, DuE PROCESS OF LAW: A BRIEF HISTORY chs. 1-2 (2003).
130. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992) (joint
opinion).
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heard might now be the most orthodox type of due process claim. 131 But courts
have moved the doctrine elsewhere.
There is no complete answer to these theories, but they are hard to accept
at this stage. The incorporation argument is undercut by a realistic
understanding of the compromise worked out by members of the Court over the
years. An element of that compromise was to draw from within the boundaries
of the Bill of Rights without obviously exceeding them. 132 Court majorities
picked and chose from an essentially closed menu defined by the first eight
amendments. This helped confine judicial creativity and, therefore, decision
costs. A freestanding undue process principle cuts against this grain. The
general observation regarding due process flexibility offers greater hope for a
broad undue process claim. But that outcome likely requires a more specific
investigation into judicial practice. The sources covered so far weigh against
generic undue process claims, and only a more particularized inquiry can
ascertain just how novel these arguments are.
2. Localized norms
A general message favoring process restraint is difficult to identify, and yet
federal constitutional law is peppered with localized undue process norms. Not
every bit of constitutional law with a potentially dampening effect on decision
costs can be itemized here; that would necessitate, among other efforts, listing
every clause and judicial opinion articulating a constitutional rule instead of a
standard. But several plausible undue process provisions and decisions can be
fruitfully explained. These strands of law are largely isolated, partisan, or
parasitic in character-with one potential exception. Some lower courts have
experimented with Mathews v. Eldridge133 in ways that could substantially
extend undue process norms. These cases might reach essentially all of the
territory now covered by due process doctrine. The discussion begins, however,
in more settled areas.
a. Positive lawmaking
Perhaps the constitutional law most effectively minimizing decision costs
receives no attention in litigation. Much constitutional text outlines institutions
(bicameral legislature, one chief executive, one supreme court) and ground
rules for their memberships and relationships (elections, appointments, the
veto, scattered voting rules). Parties with conflicting interests can produce
innumerable debates at the margins of these provisions, but key parts of their
131. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
132. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-48 (1968); id. at 171 (Black, J.,
concurring) (accepting selective incorporation as second-best to total incorporation).
133. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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content have never been in dispute. This is consistent with the popular notion
that the U.S. Constitution sets out a "framework" for the federal government.
That label sometimes prefaces a claim that constitutional text fails to settle an
important question against innovation, yet even these arguments aim to work
within the given framework. 134 Although we cannot be certain of the degree to
which conscious fidelity to text constrains institutional character at the
moment, we can be sure of the response to a suggestion that the Senate be
abolished by ordinary federal statute. These institutional basics set the stage for
positive lawmaking in a relatively predictable and stable fashion.
The content of positive law produced through these institutions is
obviously more fluid. As a formal matter, decisions about the regulation of
primary conduct are not particularly resilient. Such decisions must navigate the
Article I procedure for statute-making, for example, and the restraints of other
constitutional restrictions such as the ex post facto clauses. But unlike relatively
frozen Article III judgments, 135 there is no special constitutional hurdle to
revisiting most regulatory decisions. The nation is free to rack up decision costs
for decades considering and reconsidering the desirability of national health
insurance, progressive income taxation, and the regulation of abortion or
greenhouse gas emissions.
Yet efforts have been made to specify precisely when new positive law is
generated. One is the enrolled bill doctrine, which instructs courts to not look
beyond the signatures of the presiding officers of Congress to determine
whether a bill was actually passed by both chambers. 136 Much of the rule's
benefit is enhanced public certainty, but it can also reduce decision costs in
litigation. There are analogous decisions in the Article V amendment context,
as well. 13 7 More significantly, courts have occasionally chosen the less
demanding interpretation of the Constitution's lawmaking processes. A
powerful example is one of the earliest and least advertised constitutional
decisions of the Supreme Court. In Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 13 8 an out-of-state
creditor asked the Court to ignore what is now accepted as the Eleventh
Amendment. Hollingsworth argued, in part, that the plain text of Article I,
134. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245,
247 (2002).
135. See infra Part II.B.2.c.
136. See Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 669-73 (1892) (involving a bill
signed by the President and delivered to the Secretary of State); Matthew D. Adler &
Michael C. Dorf, Constitutional Existence Conditions and Judicial Review, 89 VA. L. REV.
1105, 1172-81 (2003); cf United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 4 (1892) (stating that "if
reference may be had" to the House Journal to check for a quorum, "it must be assumed to
speak the truth"). But cf United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 391 n.4 (1990)
(refusing to apply the doctrine to an origination clause challenge).
137. See, e.g., Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 137 (1922) (using a state legislature's
ratification notice and the Secretary of State's proclamation to foreclose a claim that the
legislature's rules were violated).
138. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798).
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Section 7 gives the President an opportunity to veto constitutional amendments
proposed by Congress.' 39 The purported Eleventh Amendment had been sent
straight to the states for ratification. Hollingsworth's objection was not without
force, though it was perhaps weakened by the identical voting rules for veto
overrides and congressionally proposed amendments. 140 In any event, the Court
was in a poor position to repudiate an amendment restricting federal
jurisdiction following the backlash to Chisholm v. Georgia, 14  and a
presentment requirement would have jeopardized the Bill of Rights as well.
The creditor's theory was rejected within a day of oral argument, with Justice
Chase suggesting that the President has no formal role in the Article V
process. 142 The Court's position accords with the practice ever since, excepting
two attempts at a Thirteenth Amendment. 143 Despite the absence of a stated
rationale, Hollingsworth helped eliminate a veto gate for amendments, which
should limit decision costs per amendment attempt.
1 4 4
Process-capping case law is tougher to identify when we turn to statute
making, but constitutional text does indicate such limits.14 5 Consider the
prospects for tricameralism. They seem dim. Article I, Section 1 tells us that
"[a]ll legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives."
An indeterminacy-loving provocateur might suggest otherwise, perhaps arguing
139. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3 ("Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the
Concurrence of te Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a
question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President .... ); Hollingsworth, 3 U.S.
at 378-79; see also U.S. CONST. art. V ("The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses
shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments .. "); cf THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at
322-23 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (discussing executive vetoes and the
threat of legislative power).
140. See Charles L. Black, Jr., Amending the Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman,
82 YALE L.J. 189, 208-09 (1972) (raising but rejecting the redundancy argument).
141. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
142. See Hollingsworth, 3 U.S. at 381 n.* (recording a statement by Justice Chase
during oral argument that "[t]he negative of the President applies only to the ordinary cases
of legislation: He has nothing to do with the proposition, or adoption, of amendments to the
Constitution").
143. See RICHARD B. BERNSTEIN & JEROME AGEL, AMENDING AMERICA: IF WE LOVE
THE CONSTITUTION SO MUCH, WHY Do WE KEEP TRYING TO CHANGE IT? 87, 91, 100 (1993)
(stating that outgoing President Buchanan signed a proposed amendment to entrench slavery
against any subsequent amendment authorizing Congress to abolish it and that President
Lincoln signed what became the Thirteenth Amendment).
144. See also Rhode Island v. Palmer, 253 U.S. 350, 386 (1920) (holding that each
House of Congress may approve proposed amendments by a two-thirds vote of those present
in the chambers); Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 230-31 (1920) (holding that states cannot
fetter ratification with nondeliberative popular referenda, without explicitly forbidding that
option to Congress); cf Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 375-76 (1921) (holding that Congress
may set a reasonable time limit for ratification of amendments). The long-run effect on
amendment attempts is, however, hard to estimate. See supra Part I.C.2.
145. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (imposing a time limit on the President's
veto decision).
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that Congress could use the Article I, Section 7 statute-making process to
authorize a third House and a method for populating it. But no conventional
lawyer would accept the argument, which is a good proxy for adherence to the
dispute-minimizing function of constitutional text. To be sure, a factor in this
reaction might be status quo bias or preferences unhitched to constitutional law
in any conventional sense. But the same outcome is easily reached with
standard interpretive material. Tricameralism is out.
Still, much of what makes the federal legislative process difficult to
complete is not dictated by conventional interpretation. Congressional
committees are not mentioned in the Constitution but their workings are
essential to understanding the legislative process. The committee system is
legitimized by the internal rulemaking grant in Article I, Section 5, which
suggests discretion within each House. It is this discretion, however, that would
authorize the two chambers to fabricate evermore elaborate decision
structures. 146 There is no obvious stopping point, making safety from
tricameralism seem almost insignificant. The most important safeguard from
decision costs in the positive lawmaking process, therefore, might be
nonconstitutional.
One final stab in this field can be made with INS v. Chadha,147 which
invalidated one-House legislative vetoes. A simple view of the case is that
Congress, at t1, satisfied the requirements of Article I, Section 7 lawmaking
while simultaneously extending its lawmaking role into t2, when an agency
might depart from the preferences of either House. The Court eliminated these
veto gates in t2. This rendering of Chadha is acceptable as far as it goes, but it
neglects plausible congressional alternatives that might tally even higher
decision costs. Absent any legislative veto, Congress could engage in more
detailed statutory drafting to cabin executive discretion, or expend greater
resources on agency monitoring through committee oversight, or systematically
stall agency rulemaking. 148 All of these options are consistent with Chadha.
The case has an undue process complexion, then, only if judged in a static
fashion or on debatable empirical assumptions.
146. This is not to suggest that congressional committees will necessarily increase
overall decision costs. One of their functions is to specialize, which can increase
productivity, and delegation of authority to a smaller unit might avert cycling and other
wasteful process.
147. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
148. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 801(a)(3), 802, 804 (2006) (delaying the effective date of any
new "major rule" to give Congress an opportunity to reject it, but following bicameralism
and presentment); see also Louis FISHER, CONSTITUTION DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS
POLITICAL PROCESS 225 (1988) (asserting that Congress engaged in "open defiance and
subtle evasion" of Chadha).
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b. Criminal procedure and rights parasites
The best known process ceilings appear in the criminal procedure clauses
of the Bill of Rights. Criminal defendants must receive speedy trials, they need
not testify against themselves, and they are immunized from double jeopardy.
These restraints are now applied against state as well as federal officials.149 Yet
even if aggressively enforced, they add little to the foundations of a generic
undue process claim. These provisions are elements in a package of guarantees
designed to promote the interests of the criminally accused (who often face
serious losses with limited means) at the expense of the prosecution (which
might have been especially feared when these clauses were adopted). Criminal
defendants may take advantage of both process ceilings and floors.15 ° To take
one stark comparison, consider information-sharing duties. The Fifth
Amendment grants criminal defendants immunity from compelled self-
incrimination, while due process doctrine mandates disclosure of exculpatory
evidence from the state to the defendant' 51 Preoccupation with the undue
process elements of criminal procedure is thus unwarranted. They are
components in a partisan set of clauses that cannot deliver a larger message
about decision costs.
152
Outside of criminal procedure, the most secure undue process claim is
parasitic. That is, other constitutional norms can be threatened by process, even
if process is not their specific concern. One of these norms condemns
"invidious" or "arbitrary" government action. Courts must be able to see
something better than animosity before they will legitimate burdens imposed by
149. See supra text accompanying notes 126-27.
150. Judge-made habeas rules regularly cut against applicants, and these rules might
be inspired by constitutional ideas. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 726
(1991) ("This is a case about federalism."); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 308-10 (1989)
(plurality opinion) (noting comity concerns and restricting retroactive application of new
rules of criminal procedure on federal habeas). But on habeas, ordinary principles of finality
have already been relaxed.
151. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
152. One idea that has migrated beyond the criminal context is indigent access to the
judicial process. Compare Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16-20 (1956) (plurality opinion)
(quoting the Magna Carta and requiring free transcripts for indigent criminal defendants
when needed for an effective appeal, even if the state may eliminate all appeals), and id. at
24-25 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("If [a state] has a general policy of allowing criminal
appeals, it cannot make lack of means an effective bar to the exercise of this opportunity."),
with M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 106-07 (1996) (holding that the state could not
condition appeals from parental rights termination decisions on the affected parent's ability
to prepay record preparation fees), and Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971)
(holding that divorce cannot be denied to a couple simply because they could not afford the
court costs). These cases have well-known limits, logical or not. See, e.g., United States v.
Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 444-45 (1973) (adjudging the interest in bankruptcy discharge less
fundamental than divorce and refusing to require an indigency exemption from filing fees);
Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 659-60 (1973) (per curiam) (refusing to require fee
waivers for appeals from agency reduction of welfare benefits).
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the state, 15 3 and excessive decision costs can violate this principle. Now,
judicial inability to see legitimate objectives might be grounded in a
contestable, value-based selection of conduct or classes as worthy of
constitutional protection. But this would reinforce the point: the case outcomes
would then be deeply parasitic, recognizing process burdens as mechanisms for
undermining (controverted) constitutional values without intimating anything
further about excessive decision costs.
Much the same can be said for more specific constitutional values. No
court would permit a legislature to impose heightened evidentiary requirements
on free exercise claims or Latino plaintiffs, simply for the purpose of
disadvantaging that conduct and that class. Some actual free speech cases fit
this model. When a bureaucracy seeks to review the content of private
expression before licensing its dissemination, courts impose-and accept-an
obligation to resolve the matter swiftly. 154 Quick response times might actually
increase the overall cost of licensing, of course, but these court decisions are at
least sensitive to regulatory burdens on valued conduct. Equal protection cases
are similar. Courts episodically invalidate attempts by one segment of the
population to elevate the procedural hurdles that another segment must clear in
order to make legal change. Leading examples involve entrenching opposition
to antidiscrimination laws in state constitutions or city charters. 155 In any event,
the presence of additional process is not doing much work here. Process is just
a type of cost made troubling by its effect on independently valued conduct or
parties.
c. Final judgments and litigation burdens
The examples just mentioned might be partisan or parasitic, but the
insulation of final federal judicial judgments looks downright parochial. Article
IV compels interstate respect for state court judgments without mentioning
their federal counterparts. 156 Yet federal courts have determined that any gap in
the Constitution regarding the finality of their judgments is intolerable. First, in
the absence of legislation, the federal judiciary developed a common law of
153. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).
154. See, e.g., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-60 (1965) (invalidating a
motion picture censorship statute that lacked certain procedural safeguards for exhibitors,
such as prompt judicial determination of whether a film was protected expression); Henry P.
Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HARV. L. REv. 518, 522 (1970).
155. See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369
(1967); see also Romer, 517 U.S. at 631; Citizens for Equal Prot., Inc. v. Bruning, 368 F.
Supp. 2d 980 (D. Neb. 2005) (striking down Nebraska's attempt to constitutionalize
opposition to gay marriage but not finding a federal constitutional obligation to recognize it),
rev'd, 455 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2006).
156. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (authorizing general federal statutes prescribing the
manner in which these judgments will be proved "and the [e]ffect thereof').
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preclusion. 15 7 Second, the Supreme Court announced a constitutional barrier to
reopening certain federal judgments. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.158
invalidated a federal statute insofar as it required federal courts to reopen final
federal judgments in civil lawsuits on grounds not established in the
prejudgment law.159
Plaut's holding is qualified, perhaps troublingly so. Congress may still
prospectively dictate when a federal judgment becomes "final." In addition, the
Court only demanded insulation for the home team: the federal judiciary. No
protection was given to state court judgments, 160 plus territorial courts and
federal agencies were distinguished into a category of non-Article III tribunals
entitled to less respect. 16 1 The Court might not be unbendingly self-protective;
a subsequent case made injunctions more vulnerable to legislative disruption
than damages judgments. 162 Yet its constitutional policy in these matters is as
conceptually isolated as criminal procedure and the rights-parasites cases. The
latter two categories skew decisions toward a vulnerable class of litigants and
favored private conduct, while the final judgment cases show judicial
opposition to political judgments that might entail more work for the courts
themselves. If there is a deep lesson in Plaut, it might concern a syndrome
rather than a policy worth promoting.
Not all judicial creativity is baldly parochial. Constitutionally inspired
litigation immunities shield a range of unwilling litigants from the burdens of
judicial process. Within certain spheres of official conduct, courts grant
absolute immunity from damages to legislators, judges, and high-ranking
executive officials. 163 States and state agencies similarly enjoy damages
immunity against private plaintiffs, although Congress may sometimes
abrogate it or bargain for consent to suit.164 Qualified immunity from damages
for individual officials, which shields discretionary conduct when not clearly
unconstitutional, is also a valuable defense. In fact, a justification for it is
related to decision costs. The idea is that many officials are sensibly delegated
157. See, e.g., Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 507-08
(2001).
158. 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
159. See id. at 218-23 (emphasizing founding-era examples of state legislatures
granting new trials or otherwise judging particular cases).
160. The Court said it wished to avoid calling into question state legislation, see id. at
226-27, 234 (withholding judgment on due process objections), which leaves state court
judgments exposed. Accord Fleming v. Rhodes, 331 U.S. 100, 102, 106-07 (1947) (allowing
federal price controls to interfere with tenant evictions backed by state court judgments).
161. See Plaut, 514 U.S. at 232; cf Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 928-29
(1997) (cabining federal authority to direct state officers, but distinguishing state courts).
162. See Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 342-45 (2000) (addressing prison reform
litigation).
163. See ERwrN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 516-28 (4th ed. 2003).
164. See Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 724-29 (2003); Alden v.
Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755-77 (1999) (noting limits to state sovereign immunity).
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discretion to make judgments, sometimes quickly and in the face of serious
danger, which can be unduly fettered with worries about litigation. 165 Finally,
every out-of-state defendant in civil litigation is protected from certain
assertions of personal jurisdiction. Relying on the Due Process Clauses, the
Supreme Court demands some kind of connection with the forum state before
its courts may reach a binding judgment.166 Each of these doctrines is partial to
some class of litigant, but each provides an effective objection to process
burdens.
d. Quasi-Mathews and substantive due process
A smattering of other precedent intimates constitutional concern for
excessive process. There is one standout, however: a judicial sensitivity to
delay, at least when the decisions of nonjudicial officers are challenged, those
officers are engaged in tasks akin to adjudication, the private need seems acute,
and the justification for inaction underwhelms the courts. These decisions
might protect either traditional real property rights or "new property," and in
that regard the intervention fits in more than one ideological slot. But while
these cases present enormous opportunities for undue process claimants, they
remain rare.
The two most important examples of judicial intervention run on slightly
different doctrinal tracks. The first extends from-or perhaps contorts-
Mathews v. Eldridge.167 At first look, this is a strange platform on which to
build an undue process claim. The case was initially taken as a path-marking
reaction against procedural mandates in the administration of government
benefits. 168 Perhaps the decision reflected emerging hostility to the benefits
themselves, but even supporters of government assistance to disadvantaged
populations can see risks associated with process-maximizing dictates. As a
general matter, poor people do not want process; they want to be less poor. If
we assume a fixed budget, then resources devoted to process "may in the end
come out of the pockets of the deserving."' 169 Moreover, the doctrinal
contribution of the case was essentially anti-process. Rather than selecting
procedural mandates according to dignitary interests in participation or by
historical analogy, the Court endorsed a flexible balancing test. That test does
165. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814-19 (1982).
166. See Kevin C. McMunigal, Desert, Utility, and Minimum Contacts: Toward a
Mixed Theory of Personal Jurisdiction, 108 YALE L.J. 189, 233-34 (1998). The minimum
contacts cases do not necessarily free defendants from all litigation burdens. The result might
be only a more convenient forum.
167. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
168. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme
Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge:
Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 28, 28-30 (1976).
169. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 348.
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suggest high decision costs in its application (it is a classic standard), but it
allows officials to combat demands for additional procedural safeguards by
pointing out administrative cost. And these cost arguments were couched as
"interests" that might justify good-faith agency decisions, not freestanding
constitutional requirements.170 The opinion looked like good news for
legislative and agency discretion.
Innovation can have unforeseen consequences, however. On a second
reading, the Mathews opinion may show a streak of undue process. Eldridge
had demanded a hearing before the agency cut off his disability benefits; the
agency offered a hearing only after the status quo had changed. The
disagreement was therefore about timing, with the recipient requesting
speed. 17 1 To be sure, Eldridge was not simply asking for a quick deadline on a
final agency decision; the agency's quick response had been to stop sending
him checks. Eldridge wanted a process in which the status quo was more
resilient-he would continue to receive benefits while the agency completed a
more intensive review of his eligibility-which fits with orthodox conceptions
of "due process as more process." Even so, his case is a step closer to an undue
process claim.
In addition, Mathews's utilitarianism created intellectual space for undue
process claims. Its balancing test placed governmental interests in decision
costs on the same plane as private interests in process modifications. 172 At the
time the case was handed down, the message might have been about leveling
down the strength of private demands. Yet the decision can also be read to
suggest a heightened judicial sensitivity to the mundane costs of process. When
joined with the task of making something like an all-things-considered
evaluation of administrative process, courts might then add ordinary decision
cost concerns to the category of private interests, without sensing they are
leaving constitutional law behind. Once constitutional judicial review is
triggered by a cognizable interest in the benefit at hand (the possibility of
which Mathews did nothing to diminish), applicants could be free to challenge
170. See id. at 335 (listing "the Government's interest, including.., the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail"); id at 349 (demanding that substantial weight be afforded to good-faith
administrator judgments about what process is due).
171. See also Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 389 (1975) ("[Tlhe rapidity of
administrative review is a significant factor in assessing the sufficiency of the entire
process."); cf Smith v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 270 U.S. 587, 591 (1926) (addressing federal equity
jurisdiction and stating that "[p]roperty may be as effectively taken by long-continued and
unreasonable delay in putting an end to confiscatory rates as by an express affirmance of
them"). But cf City of Los Angeles v. David, 538 U.S. 715 (2003) (rejecting a delay claim
as applied to recovery of a monetary penalty for allegedly illegal parking); Bob Jones Univ.
v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 747-48 (1974) (upholding deferral of litigation opportunities in the
post-collection tax context). On the timing issue generally, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10-14 (2d ed. 1988).
172. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
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agency process as either unduly dismissive of their interests or unduly
laborious in reaching decisions.
Some lower federal courts made this transition. Faced with complaints
about the burdens of administrative delay, they adapted Mathews's utilitarian
inquiry and accepted the viability of constitutional objections. Thus a landlord
might get swifter relief from rent control, 173 an allegedly disabled child could
receive an annuity without years of bureaucratic review, 174 and an immigrant
could gain relief from deportation efforts. 175 Even courts less sympathetic to
such complaints have employed Mathews to help resolve the question. 176 One
persistent issue in the welfare setting is whether applicants have an interest at
stake that can be protected as "life, liberty, or property" under the Due Process
Clauses. 177 One might conclude that the constitutional interest of an initial
applicant is somehow less potent than that of a recipient who was later cut off,
like Eldridge. This distinction might not matter under the broadest versions of
173. See Kraebel v. N.Y. City Dep't of Hous. Pres. & Dev., 959 F.2d 395, 398-99,
403-06 (2d Cir. 1992) (reversing dismissal of a landlord's claim that a city agency violated
due process by delaying reimbursement for certain lost rents from senior citizens, but
indicating deference to agency resource allocation and stressing that the landlord alleged an
indisputable right to money otherwise owed by lease), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 917 (1992).
174. See Kelly v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 625 F.2d 486, 490-91 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that a
delay of almost four years in processing a disability benefits application through three layers
of administrative review was a denial of due process, despite the agency's assertion of
limited resources); see also Walter v. City of Denver, 983 P.2d 88, 91 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998).
175. See Singh v. Reno, 182 F.3d 504, 507, 510-11 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding a colorable
due process claim, and permitting direct review in the court of appeals, where years of INS
delay in holding a hearing resulted in a criminal alien being barred from seeking
discretionary waiver of deportation under a statute enacted in the interim). But cf Elia v.
Gonzales, 431 F.3d 268, 275-76 (6th Cir. 2005) (rejecting a delay-based due process claim
where a hearing was not held until after the alien had served five years in prison), cert.
denied, 126 S. Ct. 2019 (2006).
176. See, e.g., Isaacs v. Bowen, 865 F.2d 468, 477 (2d Cir. 1989) (rejecting a claim
involving additional hearings in Medicare Part B appeals, while acknowledging "delay can
be so unreasonable as to deny due process"); United States v. Batson, 782 F.2d 1307, 1312
(5th Cir. 1986) (stating that a "delay in the administrative process can rise to the level of a
denial of due process"); Wright v. Califano, 587 F.2d 345, 354-56 (7th Cir. 1978) (rejecting
"unrealistic and arbitrary time limitations [for survivor's benefits appeals] on an agency
which for good faith and unarbitrary reasons has amply demonstrated its present inability to
comply"); cf Schroeder v. City of Chicago, 927 F.2d 957, 960 (7th Cir. 1991) (Posner, J.)
(rejecting a firefighter's attack on an eight-month delay in commencement of state disability
payments, at which time he received retroactive benefits, but acknowledging that "at some
point delay must ripen into deprivation"); O'Keefe v. Murphy, 345 N.E.2d 292, 294 (N.Y.
1976) ("[W]henever a delay in an administrative adjudication significantly or deliberately
interferes with a party's capacity to prepare or to present his case, the right to due process
has been violated.").
177. Cf Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 60 (1999) (finding, in the
alternative, no protected interest in contested "reasonable" and "necessary" medical
benefits); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 426, 431-33 (1982) (finding a
protected interest in a disability discrimination claim that was dismissed because of untimely
agency action); Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 66 (1979) (finding the same for a racehorse
trainer license that had been suspended).
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undue process; the claim would arise from any sort of unjustifiable decision
cost and need not serve the entitlement interests of any particular
beneficiary. 178 It could target global decision costs even if error costs rise. But
these lower court cases are tracking ordinary due process doctrine and, as such,
they are building undue process claims with a scope similar to familiar due
process law.
Several qualifications and concerns should be raised now. First, quasi-
Mathews claims have limits. They might be premised on a constitutionally
required hearing of some sort; without that, there is no obvious trigger for the
timing question. This prerequisite would immunize a large amount of executive
action because the Supreme Court has repudiated such participation
requirements for generally applicable rulemaking. 179 It appears that only
adjudicatory-like action is exposed. Even within this domain, the objections
have not been especially successful. 180 One such claim was filed on behalf of
Hurricane Katrina victims who demanded a more responsive FEMA. The
district court refused to order processing deadlines, which confirms that
sympathetic plaintiffs are insufficient for success. 181 Furthermore, quasi-
Mathews claims animate objections from private parties, not government
officials or a broader public interest. This might be because the Due Process
Clauses are built that way and these claims must be in accord, or because the
costs of government process are often spread to countless faceless individuals
with whom judicial review is not much concerned. Either way, these cases
serve a subset of all interests. Finally, there is a risk to validating these claims,
explored below. 182 It involves expanding undue process norms without
moderating due process dictates. There is a manic, five-finger fillet quality to
constitutional doctrine when courts demand enhanced accuracy and
participation at the same time they call for speedier decisions with lesser
burdens on private parties. Without special care, process ceilings might crash
into process floors.
The second set of lower court examples is similar, although they invoke
"substantive due process." An important success is the Stroud Township
178. These interests can be served in ways other than orders to expedite hearings or
decisions. Interest can be added to financial benefits claims if they are vindicated. Cf
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 339 (1976) (noting availability of retroactive payments).
This is not helpful to those in dire straits, but worth noting.
179. See supra note 109.
180. See supra note 176; see also Rumford Pharmacy, Inc. v. City of E. Providence,
970 F.2d 996, 999 (1st Cir. 1992) (requiring inquiry into adequacy of state remedies, like
mandamus); Steven Goldman, Administrative Delay and Judicial Relief 66 MICH. L. REV.
1423, 1434-35 (1968).
181. See supra Part I.A.2. The district court was willing to extend the hotel/motel
program, see McWaters v. FEMA, 408 F. Supp. 2d 221, 233-37 (E.D. La. 2005), producing
tension with concerns about agency resource allocation that supposedly justified its rejection
of plaintiffs' due process claim.
182. See infra Part III.C.2.
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housing controversy. There the Third Circuit, reversing judgment awarded to
township officials as a matter of law, concluded that the developer had a viable
constitutional claim based on evidence of delay and procedural burden intended
to thwart low-income housing construction without regard to local law. 183 On
this theory, people have "the right to be free from harassment in their land
development efforts," and the objection does not depend on an unfavorable
decision. 184 The process itself is the constitutional problem. These cases are
therefore tightly linked, conceptually speaking, with the quasi-Mathews
decisions. Both depend on a constitutionally cognizable interest but neither can
associate the interest at issue with a set of rights that are overtly and doctrinally
favored in the modem era. 185 These courts are protecting rather pedestrian
interests with undue as well as due process.
The substantive due process tack has not been especially successful, and its
label does not help matters. The doctrine has been tainted with unease over
appropriate judicial standards and value choices. With housing development in
particular, some observers might worry that seemingly procedural objections
are rhetorical techniques for skirting the weakness of takings doctrine, 186 or
even reviving judicial entrenchment of economic power structures in a pre-New
Deal throwback. 187 It seems not to have been noticed that some of these
claimants were asserting objections akin to those of beleaguered welfare
applicants, and that an objection to process burdens in support of a supposed
entitlement is no more "substantive" than a plea for respect through additional
process. In any event, even the Third Circuit lost enthusiasm for these sorts of
claims. It did not eliminate them, but it did hold that an "improper" motive was
insufficient, the challenged official conduct must "shock the conscience," and
183. See Woodwind Estates, Ltd. v. Gretkowski, 205 F.3d 118, 120-22, 125 (3d Cir.
2000).
184. Blanche Rd. Corp. v. Bensalem Twp., 57 F.3d 253, 268-69 & n.15 (3d Cir. 1995)
(indicating that the key questions are whether officials ignored the merits or acted with
"improper" motive); cf Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 180 (7th Cir. 1995) (allowing an
equal protection claim to go forward against a mayor who, out of personal animosity,
attempted to thwart renewal of a liquor store license); Mitchell v. Kemp, 575 N.Y.S.2d 337
(N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (invoking arbitrariness against a land-use moratorium and a delayed
zoning ordinance).
185. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
186. See, e.g., San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323 (2005)
(permitting takings claims to be channeled through and finally resolved in state courts);
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002)
(rejecting the argument that a temporary development moratorium to formulate a land-use
plan was a per se taking). But cf Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2214-15 (2006)
(opening an opinion on the Clean Water Act with a discussion of cost and delay in obtaining
permits from "enlightened despot[s]" in the Army Corps of Engineers).
187. Cf City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found., 538 U.S. 188, 200
(2003) (Scalia, J., concurring) (asserting that "[f]reedom from delay in receiving a building
permit is not among the[] 'fundamental liberty interests"' covered by substantive due
process, making irrelevant any official arbitrariness or caprice).
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having no basis in state or local law is apparently not shocking enough.' 88 If
this attitude was not represented on the Supreme Court before, it is now. Then-
Judge Samuel Alito wrote the opinion for a divided court of appeals.
Nothing like a global directive to economize on decision costs in light of
process benefits emerges from this review. The leading candidate for reducing
decision costs is just the constitutional text plus some method of interpretation.
Contemporary empirical work suggests that doing so jeopardizes little, while
achieving some restraint on constitutional debate. To be sure, there are
localized undue process norms. Some are uncontroversial even if partisan or
parasitic, as with criminal procedure and the application of other constitutional
values like speech, religion, and racial equality to process burdens. And more
could be done through extensions of Mathews and other due process doctrine.
But so far, undue process claims tend to protect relatively narrow classes of
constitutionally favored individuals or behavior.
III. UNDUE PROCESS IN THEORY
What is the proper role for undue process norms in federal constitutional
law? If the Constitution could be redrafted without cost, what kind of undue
process provisions ought to be inserted, if any? Should existing constitutional
law be pushed in that direction, building on the quasi-Mathews cases? These
are difficult questions. To address them sensibly, this Part takes four steps.
First, some basic constitutional options are clarified and narrowed. Optimal
process is rejected as an impractical goal for enforceable constitutional law.
Second, the underlying justifications for undue process concerns are elaborated
with guidance from existing process theory. Third, the question whether undue
process ought to be supreme constitutional law is examined. That calls for an
argument about political failure. Institutional and pragmatic questions also are
worth raising, especially the character of judicial review. Fourth, the analysis is
made more concrete by its application to particular disputes. The discussion
accordingly ends by returning to the undue process controversies described in
Part I.
A. Constitutional Options
The ultimate question is whether a general concern for decision costs ought
to be the kind of law often associated with the Constitution: supreme over other
188. See United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392,
399-400 (3d Cir. 2003) (applying the test found in County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S.
833, 846 (1998)); accord Torromeo v. Town of Fremont, 438 F.3d 113, 114-15, 118 (1st Cir.
2006) (housing developer); Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 997 F.2d 1369, 1371-75, 1386
(11 th Cir. 1993) (warehouse developer).
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forms of law, revocable only by Article V amendment, and enforced with some
type of judicial review. This raises the stakes. And we can make the inquiry
more challenging by accepting up front the rights-parasites cases and other
outcomes fairly dictated by existing constitutional text, conventional
interpretive methods, and judicial judgments. These conventional sources cover
irrational or totally senseless process, akin to compulsive hand-washing or an
addiction to snap judgments. Consider such process already forbidden by a
generic constitutional prohibition on arbitrary government practices.' 89 For
reasons suggested above, these circumstances-however rare-present a strong
basis for invalidating process burdens. 190 Our focus should be on more
controversial objections.
Progress can be made with a few initial distinctions among choices. If we
assume constitutional law will include some sort of general process norm, then
there are roughly four options:
(1) a demand for optimal process of law,
(2) a demand for due process of law,
(3) a prohibition on undue process of law,
(4) a combination of due and undue process guarantees.
Selecting option 1 would make the others irrelevant, as all government
process would be tested against some measure of optimality. Option 2 is part of
current federal constitutional law, while option 3 represents an alternative
world in which the Constitution and its doctrine are only concerned with
excessive process or unjustifiably high decision costs. In fact, the demands of
due and undue process can be moderated to points well below and above any
estimated sacrifice dictated by optimal process, such that space is left for
nonconstitutional judgment. It might be odd if this moderation did not occur.
Otherwise due process norms could produce, as a matter of constitutional
mandate, decision costs up to or even in excess of the optimal level but then
permit additional burdens as a matter of discretion; undue process might have
the same character but drive in the opposite direction. No good reason for these
outcomes is apparent. Given space between due and undue process, option 4 is
different from option 1. The former calls for sensitivity to both excessively
burdensome and inadequate process, yet it stops short of blanketing the field
with constitutional law.
189. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428-33 (1982) (vindicating a
due process claim); see also Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564-65 (2000)
(per curiam) (focusing on allegations of intentionally different treatment plus arbitrariness to
validate an equal protection claim involving a couple's delayed connection to the municipal
water supply).
190. See supra Part I.A.
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Figure 1. Some Constitutional Options
(Nonconstitutional Judgment)
(Nonconstitutional Judgment)
Decision
Costs
It is worth emphasizing, however, that these stylized norms are not mirror
images. Undue process involves complaints about excessive decision costs.
Those complaints may rest on burdens suffered by any number of victims-
whether private parties to a dispute, government regulators, faceless taxpayers,
or nameless alternative beneficiaries-and they might be addressed with more
than one kind of remedy. A successful objection may or may not entail the
removal of a specific process element. 9 1 But the essential feature is an
argument that someone (or everyone) is suffering excessive costs from
government decision making. In contrast, a sensible due process claim is
obviously not framed as a demand for additional decision costs. In its orthodox
procedural aspect, the claim is for an added process safeguard, such as more
effective notice and an opportunity to participate in legal proceedings.192 When
successful, these claims tend to escalate decision costs without asking for them.
Decision costs are usually just the price for some process benefit, such as
accuracy or legitimacy in the ultimate decision. The connection between these
versions of due and undue process, then, is that both include constitutional
objections tied to process and both directly influence decision costs. This leaves
four related, if not perfectly symmetrical, choices.
Option 1 should be eliminated at the outset. Current constitutional text
surely does not mandate a generalized inquiry into government process for the
purpose of achieving its objectives at the dream-level of cost. The closest
existing doctrine comes to this idea is in the quasi-Mathews cases, where some
courts demand expedited administrative action without explicitly tempering
191. See supra Part I.C.2.
192. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-12 (1985).
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process mandates that survive Mathews itself.193 But these cases did not clearly
eliminate room for policy judgment (not knowingly, anyway). And we have no
assurance that the judiciary aimed for, much less hit, the optimal form of
process under the circumstances. With so many moving parts, less than
predictable dynamic reactions, imperfect information, and limited court
competence, 194 optimal process of law is a poor fit with supreme judicial
review. Add to these concerns the doctrinal creativity involved in fabricating
optimal process norms, and it becomes an extremely unlikely addition to
judicially enforced federal constitutional law. Multi-institution collaboration
and experimentation is a superior course. Optimal process is a fine aspiration,
and no harm would be done if it were a hortatory clause in the Constitution, but
more than that is impractical.
B. Process Theories and Undue Process Policy
The live options are combinations of due and undue process, and a resort to
general theory can help. A handful of process theories have become standard
guides to the objectives of procedure. Normally they are used to shape
judgments on the minimum level of process to which a private party is entitled,
but parts of their logic may comfortably extend into undue process norms. The
first set of theories discussed is an offshoot of fundamental rights and dignity
arguments. The second set encompasses a wider group of objectives and can be
labeled utilitarian.
1. Rights retrofitted
One theme in process theory concentrates on the relatively intrinsic
importance of individual participation. 195 Before government officials reach a
decision affecting private interests, the argument goes, they ought to provide an
opportunity for affected parties to voice their opinions. Whatever additional
consequential benefits might come from this participation, it shows a respect
for the individual that human dignity requires. Limited resources and other
competing interests can qualify or override this dignity-based argument for
participation; they must, practically speaking, in the modem state. But for some
193. Recognizing Lackey claims would lead to a similar complication. See infra Part
JII.D. 1.
194. See infra Part III.C.2.
195. See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 81-100
(1985); TRIBE, supra note 171, at 666-67; Mashaw, supra note 168, at 49; Richard B.
Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values: Toward a More Responsive Approach to
Procedural Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 111, 117-18 (1978); cf Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67, 80-81 (1972) (referring to both fair play and minimization of mistaken
deprivations); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1970) ("From its founding the
Nation's basic commitment has been to foster the dignity and well-being of all persons
within its borders.").
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theorists, this is the central justification for process. A related and less
developed theory draws on notions of fundamental rights. Using a given
analytical resource, like contemporary moral reasoning or natural law or
heritage, certain rights may be privileged with exceptional legal protection.
Perhaps a right to some level of participation in at least some government
decisions qualifies for fundamental status. 196
But if the law of process should revolve around individual dignity or
fundamental human rights, it will be difficult to make room for undue process
objections. These theories might be specified in several different ways, making
it difficult to reach a firm conclusion, but undue process seems to be a poor fit
regardless. None of these theories directly concern net social welfare. They
vindicate an intrinsically valued conception of dignity, or shield vulnerable
individuals or high-priority conduct. The capacious versions of undue process
are in no way this limited. In fact, they would energize opposition to dignity-
based process demands, perhaps even overriding official decisions that grant
extensive opportunities for voice to all interested parties. Even from a
standpoint internal to dignity and fundamental rights theories, these ideas
probably cannot support a vigorous undue process norm. The mismatch occurs
because of the type of injury with which the latter is concerned. This version of
undue process is reflected in the quasi-Mathews cases and our working
definition of decision costs. 197 That definition is inclusive. It incorporates any
cost associated with decision making: money, time, uncertainty, and so on.
Many of these burdens are ubiquitous and, partly for that reason, perfectly
ordinary. 198 Dignity and rights theories are attuned to the extraordinary.
Ronald Dworkin's Principle, Policy, Procedure is in accord. Dworkin
understands the significance of process in achieving rights that trump ordinary
utilitarian calculations. Their principled recognition can be undermined unless
accompanied by a process that identifies rights violations with some degree of
accuracy. 199 This attention to accuracy is revealing, however. Dworkin is not
enthralled with process per se, at least in adjudication, which he largely treats
as an instrument for respecting rights. He argues that no one has a right to the
most accurate procedure regardless of cost, even though rights are otherwise at
stake and there is a distinct moral wrong inflicted when the innocent are
convicted or held liable.200 Instead, individuals have a basic procedural right
with two elements: (1) those who issue procedural rules must "correctly assess
the risk and importance of moral harm" from rights violations (for example,
they cannot ignore the special problem of rights deprivation by deciding to flip
coins to determine guilt), and (2) the risks imposed in one class of cases must
196. See DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 72-73 (connecting process to meaningful rights).
197. See supra Parts I.C.2, II.B.2.d.
198. See Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 90 n.22 (downgrading "rather ordinary costs" of process
compared to a right to a hearing before a property deprivation takes place).
199. See DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 72-73, 77 (focusing on adjudication).
200. See id. at 72-74, 81, 92.
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be consistent with our best theory of moral harm suggested by practices in the
other classes. 20 1 Little seems to change if there is a converse right to defeat
unfounded claims of right. 202 This right indicates additive claims to process in
the service of accuracy, but it need not produce rights in one party to a dispute
(much less third parties) to minimize the procedures demanded by another
party. Thus Dworkin writes with respect to civil litigation, "neither party has
any right against procedures more accurate than the accuracy required by" his
basic procedural right.20 3 Nothing in this analysis indicates even a narrow
version of undue process as a right, fundamental or otherwise.
That said, dignity and rights theories can be extended to a subcategory of
undue process problems. Obviously constitutional rights like the freedom of
speech or the free exercise of religion, and the opposition to racial caste, can be
undermined by strategic use of burdensome process. This is a rerun of the
rights-parasites cases described above, and it should probably be a point of
consensus. These accepted constitutional norms insulate conduct or parties
from (indefensible) burdens, and process can be no less burdensome than a tax
or fine. In addition, the concept of human dignity might be implicated by
oppressive procedure. Part of that concept demands that people be treated with
the respect owed to human agents, that when their personal interests are at stake
they should be "personally talked to about the decision rather than simply...
dealt with."2 °4 Delayed decisions entail costs within the concern of undue
process and, under certain circumstances, could implicate this dignity-based
interest in not being ignored.20 5 Less realistic scenarios might be problematic in
this dual fashion. Requiring only the poor to personally participate in hearings
involving their debts would not only impose ordinary costs on that class, it
might also carry an intolerable suggestion of untrustworthiness from a dignity
theorist's perspective.
Yet all of this is fairly modest. The examples are derivative: an
independent commitment with a high, possibly lexical, priority is threatened by
process but only coincidently. The essential problem is humiliation, or free
speech, or some other value. Process is just one vehicle for the injury. On the
201. See id. at 88-93, 96; see also id. at 85 ("[N]o decision may deliberately impose on
any citizen a much greater risk of moral harm than it imposes on any other."); id. at 95-96
(stating that these are not rights to a particular level of accuracy in adjudication).
202. See id. at 96 ("When issues of substance are at stake, the defendant's rights begin
where the plaintiffs leave off .... ) (emphasis added).
203. Id. Dworkin does go on to assert that no residual utilitarian policy question about
admission of additional evidence is left over once the parties' basic procedural rights are
respected. See id. at 97. This suggests he believes that optimal process is achieved by his
framework. But the framework does not capture the broad versions of undue process.
204. TRIE, supra note 171, at 667; see also id. at 666.
205. Cf Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972) ("For when a person has an
opportunity to speak up in his own defense, and when the State must listen to what he has to
say, substantively unfair and simply mistaken deprivations of property interests can be
prevented.").
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other hand, demands for additional process might be more easily associated
with "fundamental" human values. For instance, promoting opportunities for
voice, such as a public hearing in which a person or her advocate can explain
her position, seems to be a theme in the work of dignity-oriented process
scholars.20 6 Preventing someone from enjoying such participation, for the
purpose of saving cash or avoiding hassle, cannot enjoy the same priority
within such theories, especially insofar as costs are shouldered by officials and
taxpayers. Otherwise, every fundamental right might have an anti-right shoving
in the opposite direction. The very idea of fundamentality would then lose
meaning. Granted, a theory of rights cannot easily dictate maximum accuracy
in the adjudication of rights regardless of cost. But at least the motivation for
enhanced decision-making procedures is tightly connected to arguably
imperative concerns.
2. Utilitarianism and rule of law
The theories just discussed can support a few undue process arguments but
not many. A more utilitarian theory promises to encompass a larger set of
objections.
Utilitarian cost/benefit analysis certainly fits with sensitivity to the
pedestrian burdens of government decision making, and it provides no obvious
reason for partisanship. 20 7 Costs imposed on private parties are no different in
principle from costs borne by government officials, their employers, or
taxpayers. Moreover, utilitarianism can be sensitive to all sorts of decision
costs: money, time, consternation, despair, and opportunity costs. And
costibenefit analysis can be applied regardless of the goals chosen for a given
process: accurate information about existing law and historical fact, or better
application of law to individual cases, or creation of socially beneficial new
law, or peaceful acceptance of government decisions, or even moral
legitimacy. 208 These goals all come at a price, which will sometimes be
intolerable compared to the decisional objectives. Indeed in some cases,
decision costs are imposed for nothing recognizable as a benefit-such as when
process is irrational or a tool for defeating valid rights claims. In a more
challenging set of cases, decisionmakers acting in good faith accept decision
costs in exchange for enhanced accuracy or some other legitimate objective.
206. See supra note 195 (collecting sources).
207. See, e.g., BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 65, ch. 6 (addressing voting rules);
POSNER, supra note 13, ch. 21; Robert E. Scott, Constitutional Regulation of Provisional
Creditor Remedies: The Cost of Procedural Due Process, 61 VA. L. REV. 807, 809-10
(1975) (focusing on accuracy in adjudication).
208. See, e.g., E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 66-83 (1988) (connecting perceived procedural "fairness" to
satisfaction and compliance); Stephen H. Legomsky, Forum Choices for the Review of
Agency Adjudication: A Study of the Immigration Process, 71 IOWA L. REv. 1297, 1313
(1986) (collecting objectives for administrative process).
December 2006]
HeinOnline  -- 59 Stan. L. Rev. 653 2006-2007
STANFORD LA W REVIEW
These situations can raise difficult questions about the wisdom of the exchange
and the appropriate strategy to prevent poor choices. Either way, utilitarian
inquiry may provide a framework for the answers.
20 9
A case also can be made for a broad undue process policy to protect
democratic outcomes and the rule of law. First, in some situations government
officials (or private parties) take advantage of process burdens to cloak their
opposition to the directives of positive law. The rights-parasite cases are
examples, and the Stroud Township development fight might be as well. In
these cases process is imposed as a technique for evading substantive policy
judgments ordinarily entitled to respect. Regardless of the implications for
fundamental rights or dignity, utilitarians can see the advantages of undue
process norms for confirming the illegality of such circumvention. Second,
unchecked procedural burdens might prompt undesirable responses from those
who are injured. In extreme cases the response might be violence or disregard
for official authority. In other cases the threat is corruption-specifically,
bribes offered to achieve quick, less expensive, and favorable results. The
Magna Carta was partly intended as a remedy to corruption-encouraging undue
process. And a recent study of corruption in Peru delivers a similar message
with modern statistical support. Economist Jennifer Hunt concludes that the
frequency and amount of bribes offered is partly related to the speed with
which government decisions are otherwise made, not simply the type of client
served.211
An important caution involves indeterminacy. Designing efficient and just
process for government decision making is challenging and requires attention
to contextual detail. It is unclear just how law-like the principles of design can
be. Extremes can be ruled out, but this only forecloses relatively clear dictates
within a large field of discretion. More specifically, no one wants a government
209. The usual objections to utilitarianism apply, of course. The conflicting values
might be difficult to reduce to a common metric without sacrificing something or
misdirecting the assessment; in addition, certain injuries might count as particularly severe
or lexically prior to others in order to satisfy a sense of morality. See generally JOHN FINNIS,
NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 112-17 (1980). But these objections do not seem any
more serious here.
210. See supra text accompanying note 119.
211. Between 2002 and 2004, thousands of Peruvians responded to government-
sponsored surveys on their bribing habits and other matters. Hunt used this data to run
regressions, controlling for variables such as client characteristics (including employment)
and for the frequency of contact with different types of officials. The judiciary, which has a
poor record of concluding matters within a year, comes out particularly badly in terms of
both bribe rate and amount. See Jennifer Hunt, Why Are Some Public Officials More Corrupt
than Others?, in HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC CORRUPTION (Susan Rose-Ackerman ed.,
forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 2-6, 22-25), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-=904330
(conceding, however, that client characteristics largely explain variance in bribe rates across
official types, and also singling out the poor bribery record of the police who have a higher
completion rate). Data do not seem to be available on whether both sides to a judicial case
pay offjudges for speed, or whether a bribe always purchases a particular result.
[Vol. 59:601
HeinOnline  -- 59 Stan. L. Rev. 654 2006-2007
UNDUE PROCESS
that maximizes decision costs, at least no one who wants a functioning
government. Nor should anyone crave a government operating on the lowest
decision costs possible. That goal is senseless even if feasible. A government
that adjudicated every dispute through a random number-generating algorithm
would not last long or do much business.
The appropriate level of decision cost can only be selected in conjunction
with several other choices. First, objectives of the process must be identified to
understand the trade-offs. Some goals are simply more important than others,
so they might justifiably come with greater decision costs insofar as the added
process helps reach the goal. Second, the designer needs a sense of the
consequences that follow one process over another. Even if the goal is clearly
defined, more than one process will likely be available to produce the desired
decision. In resolving this issue and insofar as it is cost-justified, process design
should also account for relevant patterns of cognitive bias and group dynamics
that are reliably identified by social science. There is little sense in using a
simple rational-actor model if it is unlikely to hold in practice and if process
designers can reasonably know how decisionmakers are likely to diverge from
those assumptions. Third, attention must be paid to the area of decisions
generated by the process options under consideration, along with the duration
and resilience of those decisions. 213 Finally, thought should be given to the
ways in which different process choices interact over time, considering all
elements of process with significant effects on decision costs. This means
participation norms, information-gathering efforts, voting rules and veto gates,
rules/standards options, and so forth.
At least part of the information relevant to these choices will not be
available when they are made. Surely there are defensible rules to guide some
fraction of process design. Even so, the uncertainty and risk accompanying
these choices make it difficult or impossible to fully optimize process, and this
is true even if every conflicting value is commensurable. The best achievable
law of process, therefore, might include undue process norms without
expecting a perfect accommodation of process and non-process goals. This
thought will be further developed below. For now the basic idea is that optimal
process is often unlikely, even if excessive decision costs sometimes can be
identified without dispute.
212. See, e.g., JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 134-47, 288-302 (3d ed.
2000); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3 (Daniel Kahneman et
al. eds., 1982); Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110
YALE L.J. 71, 74-75 (2000). Judges may fall victim to these same syndromes, of course.
213. See supra Part I.C.I.
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C. Undue Process as Constitutional Law
Both sets of process theories, whether rights-based or more utilitarian, can
accommodate undue process norms. But the latter is suited to a larger vision of
undue process that captures all sorts of decision costs. Arguments from
fundamental rights or individual human dignity come more easily when the
objection involves government process that is exclusionary, or rushed, or
running on educated guesses. Still, the standard process theories all point
toward some kind of undue process norm. The hard choices involve scope and
specifics. The foregoing discussion does not say much about federal
constitutional law, however. It speaks to policy and moral reasoning without
bearing down on precisely how undue process considerations should be
integrated with a supreme, entrenched, fundamental law.
1. Stories of systematic failure
To be convinced that undue process is a valuable addition to federal
constitutional law, an account of political failure is useful. There might be no
advantage to using constitutional law if ordinary law and politics are
trustworthy. This idea folds into a second line of thought, concerning
institutional choice and design. Undue process, like any other norm with
controversial applications, requires an enforcement strategy. That means undue
process might be a sound policy or even a constitutional value without
becoming attached to the most assertive forms of judicial review. These
considerations are connected, but they can be elaborated sequentially.
The reasons for the existence of the original Due Process Clause are
drenched with history.2 14 A similar norm was said to bind the English
monarchy, at least as a matter of tradition. As noted above, that norm was
partly a response to royal judicial corruption and heavy-handed assertions of
executive power against elite property rights. The first Due Process Clause was
similarly a component of a new bargain regarding the exercise of centralized
authority. It was one of the assurances given to skeptics of a new federal
government structured and empowered in a way that raised concerns in the
existing states. We have already seen why undue process norms are more
difficult to ground in this history; text and other evidence present hurdles.
2 15
But neither can due process proponents rely on two-hundred-year-old
compromises as a substitute for a vibrant theory of political failure. Is there
reason to believe that government officials, acting without the threat of
constitutional violation or judicial review, will systematically underproduce or
overproduce process and decision costs?
214. See generally HOWARD, supra note 117, at 298-301; ORTH,supra note 129, ch. 1.
215. See supra Part II.B.1.
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This raises debatable empirical queries. There is no simple consensus
model of real-world official behavior; certainly different officials attempt to
maximize and compromise different values to different degrees in given
institutional settings. But the necessary assumptions can be spelled out and
tested for facial plausibility. For example, one might suppose that a substantial
number of people gaining positions of official authority, reinforced when
necessary with coercive force, will be tempted to abuse that power. They might
use official authority to achieve personal financial gain or to shirk
responsibilities. Or they might strive to entrench their position, relying on the
relative difficulty outsiders will have in assessing claims of official effort and
progress. Or they might come to trust their own judgment to the exclusion of
others, despite a lack of information or a widespread normative disagreement
that ought to soften any predisposition to insularity. 216 Working from a widely
accepted theory of democracy, these officials are agents of the public and the
feared behavior constitutes abuse of that relationship. 217 Monitoring and
responding to such misconduct (through elections, for example) might be a
challenge for the general public. 2 18 Members of Congress, perhaps alerted by
organized interests or others, can help check large-scale misconduct in other
institutions and perhaps remedy a few individualized cases. But Congress
cannot always be trusted, especially during periods of unified government and
partisan solidarity outmatching institutional competition. 2 1  There are a
multitude of unconfirmed assumptions in this familiar line of reasoning, yet it
is entirely rational and standard to conclude that ordinary politics leaves space
for official misconduct or illegitimate refusals to act. A constitutional law of
process insulated from ordinary democratic change would then be in play,
perhaps enforced with some kind of judicial review.
If we can expect principal-agent and other problems in official conduct,
these abuses may take the form of process manipulation. Overconfidence,
216. See, e.g., Colin F. Camerer & Eric J. Johnson, The Process-Performance Paradox
in Expert Judgment: How Can Experts Know So Much and Predict So Badly?, in RESEARCH
ON JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING: CURRENTS, CONNECTIONS, AND CONTROVERSIES 342,
347-49 (William M. Goldstein & Robin M. Hogarth eds., 1997) (distinguishing training from
experience and reviewing studies).
217. See 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 934 (1794) (statement of Rep. Madison) ("[T]he
censorial power is in the people over the Government, and not in the Government over the
people."); Adam M. Samaha, Government Secrets, Constitutional Law, and Platforms for
Judicial Intervention, 53 UCLA L. REV. 909, 916-20 (2006) (discussing democracy, agency
problems, and secrecy).
218. See John Ferejohn, Accountability and Authority: Toward a Theory of Political
Accountability, in DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND REPRESENTATION 131, 137 (Adam
Przeworski et al. eds., 1999); Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics,
and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 345, 356 (2000) (claiming that
mechanisms of control over government officials by voters are probably less forceful than
those used to discipline corporate management).
219. See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers,
119 HARV. L. REv. 2311, 2315 (2006).
December 2006]
HeinOnline  -- 59 Stan. L. Rev. 657 2006-2007
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
shirking, and desires to entrench and abuse authority might lead to
suboptimally low procedural safeguards. For example, the insular and heavy-
handed official might not see value in information gathering or private party
participation before decisions are made. The extreme position on this line is
simply dictatorship, and we can see facets of the due process norm as insulation
from this result. There are also more subtle uses of process that will be
attractive to the wayward agent, including some that implicate undue process
concerns. By gaining distance from substantive outcomes, procedural
manipulation might be somewhat insulated from charges of misconduct. Delay
can be used in this fashion, along with heavy demands for information,
participation, or extended deliberation that have an ostensible connection to a
facially appropriate process goal.
The more relevant issue for present purposes is about asymmetric threats:
whether there is sound reason to fear indefensible process denials any more
than indefensible process burdens. The arguments thus far are too generic to
make that distinction. If officials are highly prone to misconduct, process
designers should not be preoccupied with subtle distinctions between the
techniques of faithlessness. So consider two possibilities for distinguishing due
from undue process threats.
First, if there were no general process clause of any kind, perhaps the
expected magnitude of harm from due process violations would be greater than
from undue process violations. For example, one might believe that the
unjustified denial of a hearing right is more cause for alarm than the unjustified
grant of a hearing demand. The problem is that this judgment requires not only
educated guesses about the specific violations likely to occur, but also a
normative evaluation of harm. Some types of harm might be viewed as worse
than others, as indicated by the rights and dignity discussion above, 220 but
delay and inexcusably burdensome process can inflict similar injuries. Being
ignored or rolled in official deliberations is not categorically more damaging
than being put off through inordinate delay or "given the runaround" within an
exhausting bureaucratic maze. Plus, erroneous process mandates can disrupt
fragile compromises or cause unanticipated harm. Perhaps policymakers are
working within a restricted budget and expect a certain number of
disadvantaged people to qualify for assistance, who can be timely reached only
by no-frills process that tolerates regular error.221 Hearing rights might increase
voice and accuracy for those who get to use them, while diminishing the overall
scope and effectiveness of the program. An adequate comparison of harm
magnitude is thus complex, and unlikely to yield a reliable categorical
advantage for either due or undue process norms.
Alternatively, it could be that the frequency of due process violations
would be higher than undue process violations. This possibility is attractive
220. See supra Part III.B. 1.
221. FEMA assistance to Hurricane Katrina victims might fit here.
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although hard to test. Albeit with complaints, the country has survived with an
explicit due process guarantee that appears not to have been vigorously used for
undue process purposes until recently. Our sense of the matter might be
affected by the evolution of government character and missions, however. In a
situation like that during the early years of the nation, when the federal
government's functions were unsettled and contentious, perhaps resource
constraints were likely to conflict with the regulatory ambitions of central
government officials. Even if those ambitions were public regarding, there
might have been worry that officials would all-too-readily jettison rudimentary
procedural hindrances. On the other hand, the frequencies of due and undue
process violations might shift in a mature bureaucracy with an established turf
to defend.222 Comparatively speaking, today's federal government is a
behemoth that could not have been foreseen during the founding era. It now
administers a vast set of regulatory programs and entitlements. 223 The defense
or expansion of this turf might involve red tape rather than overly aggressive
action. Perhaps some government officials generate additional process in a way
that inflates their importance. Regardless, modem observers have to be
concerned that bloated protocols will too often obstruct or delay warranted
222. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. NIsKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT 38-41 (1971). To be clear, turf-building claims are contested. See Daryl J.
Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915, 923-
34 (2005) (highlighting subsequent scholarship).
223. Exactly what effect constitutionally optional entitlements should have on the
constitutional law of procedure is a long-standing academic debate, which started to bloom
with the post-Goldberg "due process revolution." Part of the dispute was whether certain
social welfare entitlements were themselves constitutionally required, independent of any
lapse in political commitment to them. That idea was more or less rejected by the Supreme
Court in the 1970s, see, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970) (upholding
caps on welfare payments to families), although moderated versions of social welfare rights
emerged in some foreign constitutions of the 1990s and through state constitutional litigation
involving public education funding. See supra note 99 (citing sources); see also Town of
Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, (2005) (rejecting for lack of entitlement a "due
process" claim to more serious police consideration of pleas to enforce a restraining order);
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195-96 (1989).
There is overlap--functional if not conceptual-between some undue process claims
and pure social welfare or service delivery claims. An individual who demands immediate
delivery of income support from a bureaucracy or shorter response times from the local
police department is not very different from the individual who argues that these services are
per se mandated by constitutional law. And those who want to achieve the latter objective
probably favor the former as well. There is a meaningful distinction between the two claims,
however. This type of undue process claim is parasitic on a democratic choice to make the
entitlement, and it might even deter or confine new entitlements by increasing their
associated decision costs. The pure claim for social welfare rights lacks these features.
Moreover, there is no heavy ideological valence for undue process claims under current
conditions. They may assist the real estate developer or people with disabilities, the
pharmaceutical innovator or the food stamps applicant. Supporters of the undue process
concept might have to accept a relatively efficient government, however, and reject the
strategy of limiting the state by increasing the cost of its process. In addition, one strand of
undue process tends to favor executive action, and this might trigger ideological divides.
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decisions, frustrating some citizens and encouraging others to engage in
destructive forms of self-help or corruption.
Furthermore, one type of undue process problem might be insidious. It is
the syndrome of nonsalient injury and it can affect our estimates of both
frequency and magnitude of harm. Recall that the most ambitious versions of
undue process move beyond officials burdening one party or another with
indefensible decision costs. The concept includes threats to nonparties, such as
taxpayers who finance government decision making as well as others who have
an interest in speed or a streamlined protocol.22 4 When process is awarded to A
and/or B, often C suffers or is put at risk. These threats might not be salient-
cognitively or politically-to officials who are otherwise free to design their
own decision-making process. To the extent that administrative costs of
procedural safeguards are spread to nameless and faceless taxpayers or
potential alternative beneficiaries of government programs, these costs seem
less likely to generate intense political backlash 22 5 or vivid losses that will be
immediately available to the process arbiter.2 26 We might plausibly reach a
different conclusion about the hoped-for gains associated with decision costs,
such as accuracy and legitimacy in the minds of participants. Conventional due
process doctrine probably feeds this asymmetric salience, as it presents the
threat of judicial rebuke for low-decision-cost process but not the reverse. 227 At
the very least, salience problems shake any a priori conclusion that due process
violations swamp undue process risks in the modern state.
There is reason to support the inclusion of a process clause in the
Constitution, but the content of that provision is easily contested. Indeed, the
case for a due process clause enforced by supreme judicial review is not
indisputable. One might at least conclude that the case for an undue process
clause is not dramatically weaker than for the clause we actually have.
2. Institutional choice and design
If the analysis thus far is correct, a process law of some kind is easily
defended, and the desirability of constitutionalizing part of that law is at least
224. See supra Parts IB, I.C.2, 1II.A.
225. See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION ch. 2 (1971);
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory
for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REv. 275, 291 (1988) (suggesting that "procedural
obstacles do little to impede consensual demand patterns (where laws bring concentrated
benefits and dispersed costs)").
226. See, e.g., BARON, supra note 212, at 141-43 (discussing the availability heuristic,
which can confound accurate estimation of probability); Cass R. Sunstein, Probability
Neglect, 112 YALE L.J. 61, 81-82 (2002) (identifying outright probability neglect as distinct
from availability heuristics).
227. To the extent officials are spooked by due process doctrine, however, the solution
might be relaxation of those constitutional norms rather than introduction of a new one.
Mathews suggests this response is possible.
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plausible. Ordinary politics, administrative behavior, and judicial practices will
not always generate process that optimally serves the public interest or majority
preferences. Although an enforced constitutional demand for optimal process of
law seems impractical, generalized due and undue process guarantees might
both be attractive if they are well-crafted. As a theoretical matter, the
arguments do not seem clearly better for one over the other. Members of the
public should be, and probably are, concerned about both kinds of error. A
central element of the analysis is still missing, however. This Subpart explores
whether judicial review is a sensible addition to an undue process norm.
Perhaps this inquiry into institutional choice will tip the arguments against
undue process, or at least reveal practical differences between due and undue
process that have been elusive so far.
228
A fundamental trade-off posed by judicial review is between competence
and independent judgment. That exchange is grounded in two ideas about
official behavior.229 The first is probably self-evident. It is the thought that
familiarity with a situation builds practical knowledge. Trained officials who
repeatedly perform similar tasks in similar settings, or who have operated
within an organization for a substantial term, are more likely to correctly assess
the consequences of one process over another. All else equal, insider
knowledge beats outsider guesses. But all else is not equal. The second idea
about official behavior is that self-judgment can threaten the public good. Like
anyone else, government officials might be selfish and irresponsible or myopic
and overconfident about their own abilities. 230 Outsiders, in contrast, might
offer a more accurate assessment of work performed by others-if they possess
sufficient skill to perform the observation. But this shifts the inquiry back to
knowledge asymmetries and makes the issue of external oversight look like a
tragic dilemma. The two ideas seem to present a maddening zero-sum trade:
competence with bias, or dispassion with naivet6. Court judgments are subject
to this exchange. Judges might be honest yet error-prone brokers, or parochial
yet expert players. And under certain versions of judicial review, their
constitutional opinions are supreme. In addition, there is a decision cost to this
type of oversight. Constitutional judicial review adds a veto gate to process
decisions, so judicial review can itself increase net decision costs. These costs
can be minimized: if judicial preferences are made clear and articulated in
large-area decisions announcing comprehensive rules, then speculation and
228. On institutional choice and design theories generally, see, for example, David L.
Weimer, Institutional Design: An Overview, in INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 1, 12 (David L.
Weimer ed., 1995). See also NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING
INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, EcoNoMIcs, AND PUBLIC POLICY 5 (1994); Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian
Vermeule, Institutional Design of a Thayerian Congress, 50 DUKE L. 1277, 1280 (2001)
(distinguishing choice from design).
229. I have made this observation elsewhere. See Samaha, supra note 23, at 525-26.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 216-19.
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litigation costs should fall for everyone else. But by now the vulnerabilities of
this approach should be easy to discern.231
There are several responses short of eliminating external oversight. Some
government process is simple enough for judges to become educated in a short
time. Incompetence is then an easily corrected condition. In addition, we might
retain constitutional judicial review but hope to sculpt it such that error costs
are reduced without intolerable decision costs. For those who support
fundamental rights or individual dignity theories, we might expect judges to be
more capable of understanding and respecting these values than certain other
government officials. The scope of judicial review could be restricted to
situations in which those values are in jeopardy. In a related vein, the judiciary
might commit itself to small-area decisions. This can leave more room for
experimentation, adaptation, and course reversals, albeit with a new set of
decision costs that follow the shadow of litigation. Regardless of the scope of
judicial review, its intensity might be moderated. Thus in cases where outsider
education is costly and valuable rights are not at stake, the judiciary might
normally defer to expert judgment of other officials. This has actually happened
in landmark due process cases like Mathews v. Eldridge232 and perhaps Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld.233 There are even ways to moderate the resilience and supremacy
of judicial review, although federal courts seem to deploy these options
sparingly and they threaten to hike up decision costs over the long run. In
evaluating constitutional claims, the force of stare decisis is said to be weaker,
anyway. 2 34 Perhaps it could leave even more room for judicial reconsideration
in the class of undue process claims. Or courts might leave final judgments to
another institution such as Congress, thereby testing hopefully more efficient
process without foreclosing error correction by others. 235
Finally, oversight need not come from judges. Congress sometimes
aggressively monitors agency practices, for instance, or legislates to achieve
efficient administration. A model is the Office of Inspector General (OIG).236
OIGs are embedded within certain agencies and charged with identifying
waste, fraud, and abuse of executive power, yet they have some insulation from
231. Note, too, justiciability norms and litigation strategy that can skew court dockets.
232. 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976) (demanding that substantial weight be afforded good-
faith administrator judgment about what process is due under the circumstances).
233. 542 U.S. 507, 528-39 (2004) (following the Mathews framework and stopping
well short of dictating Article III criminal process, but rejecting the executive's position on
the process due U.S. citizens detained on U.S. soil after capture on a foreign battlefield); see
also Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 425 (1988) (concluding that Congress did not fail
to provide "meaningful safeguards or remedies").
234. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1989).
235. See Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreward:
Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1, 2-3, 15-17, 20-21, 29, 34 (1975)
(discussing, in part, the dormant commerce clause and Miranda warnings).
236. See generally PAUL C. LIGHT, MONITORING GOVERNMENT: INSPECTORS GENERAL
AND THE SEARCH FOR ACCOUNTABILITY (1993).
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pressure by agency management. 237 The OIG track record might not be perfect,
but the basic idea was an innovative response to the old trade-off between
competence and impartiality. Given the OIGs' mission, moreover, their
existence should somewhat curb any enthusiasm for judicial supremacy over
undue process objections, at least with respect to the federal executive.238
So if the question is whether judicial review of undue process claims is
likely to do more good than harm, there is no easy answer. The choices are not
binary; both judicial review and undue process objections come in multiple
forms. One way forward is to consider reasons to be comfortable without
judicial review of a generic undue process norm, then attempt to specify
conditions under which judicial review is most likely to succeed.
Leaving the issue to ordinary law and politics would probably not be, and
has not been, disastrous. Without generic and judicially enforced undue process
claims, the system would function roughly the way it does now. Congress
might legislate to add, subtract, or otherwise modify the decision-making
procedures for the executive branch and for the federal judiciary. 239 Insofar as
it has not, the executive and judiciary might draft their own rules for their own
purposes, as well as consider pleas for reform.240 If the system errs and
manufactures excessive protocols for decision, pressure for change may come
from officers within those institutions or from outsiders. In addition, the
mechanism for reform could be either internal (institutions altering their own
processes) or external (legislation or even constitutional amendment). Certainly
there are limits to this structure. Congress tends to run its own shop, and state
process is often unchecked by federal statute or regulation. But typically the
process for creating process already involves consent from more than one
institution.
And the existing avenues for reform have yielded meaningful results.
Putting aside monitoring and deterrence from OIG investigations and reports,
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) authorizes courts to order action in
the face of unreasonable delay.24 1 In 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective
237. See NASA v. FLRA, 527 U.S. 229, 240 (1999) (noting, however, that "[t]here is
no 'OIG-OIG').
238. Judicial intervention need not be entirely foreclosed. On the concept of
constitutionally optional platforms that support judicial intervention for constitutional
objectives, see Samaha, supra note 217, at 960-69 (demanding an existing constitutional
norm, however).
239. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (granting Congress power "[t]o make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution... all other Powers vested
by this Constitution").
240. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (2006) (granting federal courts authority to
"prescribe rules for the conduct of their business," if consistent with statutes); Dep't of Navy
v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988) (recognizing inherent executive authority to restrict
access to sensitive information).
241. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006) ("The reviewing court shall--(1) compel agency action
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed .... "). It seems this provision is rarely
invoked successfully in litigation. For a partial exception, see Biodiversity Legal Foundation
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Death Penalty Act codified judicial practice and added new restrictions on
federal habeas corpus, including a one-year limitations period and strict
requirements for second and successive applications. 242 And the Tax Injunction
Act forbids federal district court injunctions only if "a plain, speedy and
efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State." 243 Each of these
efforts authorizes judicial action that can limit decision costs in a
subconstitutional way. The net benefit of these efforts is not always clear,
244
but neither is any dominance of pro-process forces over anti-process interests in
ordinary politics.
For some categories of cases, this hands-off approach is too sanguine. And
if those categories are readily apparent, judicial review for undue process is
probably just as desirable as for due process. The leading candidate is
administrative adjudication.
Courts not only deal in procedure constantly, but agency adjudication is
probably the nonjudicial process most recognizable to judges. Concerns about
incompetence are therefore reduced, while the judiciary might be detached in a
healthy fashion. In addition, because judicial process is often more elaborate
than agency adjudication, there could be an internal check on judicial
insensitivity to agency needs. Courts are likely accustomed to the sort of
extended procedure on which an undue process complaint would typically rest.
This would not always be true, of course. Demands for agency speed might
enjoy too much sympathy since the courts will not bear the costs of haste. But
low intensity judicial review is a possible cure, with deference to reasonable
administrative judgment. Conveniently, Mathews already made this adjustment
for due process objections that an administrative process is insufficiently
attentive to an applicant's claim to benefits. As the quasi-Mathews cases
indicate, 24 5 it is a short step in familiar terrain for courts to treat administrative
decision costs as a matter of constitutional concern. Assuming the same level of
deference, the judiciary is no less competent running Mathews's all-told
cost/benefit test in the opposite direction. If judicial review for undue process
can be supported in any context, ordinary administrative adjudication is it.
In fact, undue process advocates should probably forfeit all claims
involving the generation of prospective and generally applicable rules,
v. Norton, 285 F. Supp. 2d 1, 12-17 (D.D.C. 2003). But even if agencies are violating the
statutory standard, it is not clear that a constitutional norm would look much different or be
more effective.
242. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (2006); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 1 l(b)(1).
243. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006).
244. Habeas rules have generated enough litigation to forestall any snap judgment that
they reduce decision costs. To take another example, the time limits for agency response in
the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6) (2006), are commonly thought to be
ineffective. But cf ACLU v. Dep't of Def., 339 F. Supp. 2d 501, 504-05 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(ordering certain executive agencies to respond to eleven-month-old FOIA requests for
documents regarding post-9/l 1 detainees).
245. See supra Part II.B.2.d.
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legislation, and doctrine. Once again, a similar line already operates in
orthodox due process territory although on a distinct rationale. 246 Compared to
most adjudication, it is categorically more difficult to demonstrate excessive
decision costs in these fields. One reason is that courts would be forced to
compare decision costs to the social value of such rules, which is controversial
for the regulation of primary human conduct. When is it evident that the
political process has grappled with stem cell research subsidies long enough, in
light of the issue's significance and the diminishing value of debate?
Even if such questions have answers other than "never," there remains a
crucial distinction from ordinary adjudication. It is the disparate comfort with
decisional resilience. If we think of adjudication as the interpretation and
application of otherwise revisable policy to the decisionmaker's rendition of
historical fact, tolerance for reconsideration often should be low. Adjudication
of this type ought to be resilient because the historical facts will not often be
worth revisiting by government officials and the policy in question will not be
fully set in this process. If we think of rulemaking as the process by which
these policies are created and revised, resilience and unlimited duration are out
of place. This is especially so when substantial shifts in preferences are likely
over time.247 It is for this reason hard to fathom a law of res judicata for
statutes, whether or not enforced by the judiciary. Society is probably better off
with freedom to revisit questions like the desirability of national health
insurance, income taxes over consumption taxes, and the death penalty-even
though reconsideration means decision costs. There is no guarantee the
adjudication/rulemaking line is adequately nuanced; retroactive legislation, for
instance, might be an easier target for decision cost caps than many acts of
adjudication. But the distinction seems to hold as a general matter.
For different reasons, supreme judicial review of process imposed on the
judiciary itself is also problematic. Obviously courts are informed about the
operations of their own institution, but here they are most likely to assume
parochial stances. This threat is acute when the upshot of the objection calls for
reduction in judicial effort. Then one must worry that a court will invoke
constitutional law to manage its own workload without adequate sympathy for
246. See supra note 109 (citing cases relying on impracticality and political
safeguards, along with judicial competence concerns); see also Kenneth C. Davis, An
Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARv. L. REV. 364,
402-10 (1942) (developing a related distinction between "adjudicative" and "legislative"
facts); Ann Woolhandler, Rethinking the Judicial Reception of Legislative Facts, 41 VAND.
L. REV. 111, 114 (1988) (emphasizing overlap in the categories). Judicial competence
questions fit with the analysis in text. But the feasibility and political safeguards rationales
are controversial even for due process claims. The possibility of mass public input is now
perfectly conceivable with the development of notice-and-comment rulemaking and modern
communications technology. And strong strands of contemporary public choice theory deny
that widely dispersed burdens systematically trigger widespread political backlash. See supra
note 225.
247. Cf Posner, supra note 65, at 445 (distinguishing litigation from advertising).
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other interests. And the ubiquity of decision costs makes public-spirited
rhetoric easier to deploy. Process imposes costs on a large class of people and,
like other officials, judges can use that fact to appear sympathetic while serving
lower-minded interests in docket clearing. An independent judiciary can have
clear advantages over other actors, but judging whether a case is too much
work is probably not one of them. This makes highly questionable, from an
institutional design Perspective, the Court's protection of its own civil
judgments in Plaut.24 8
There is no need to exhaust the possibilities for undue process in this space.
It is appropriate, however, to close with a suggested tiebreaker: when in doubt,
reject undue process as a judicially enforceable federal constitutional norm.
This position is supported by two arguments. The first involves the role of
constitutional text in reducing decision costs. Those who are especially
sensitive to decision costs--even those who view government institutions as
consistently weighted down with routines and habitually foisting process
burdens on those they serve and on third parties---ought to pause before
endorsing supreme constitutional law as a palliative. The government has a
patent obligation to refrain from significant injury to private parties without
minimum procedural safeguards. Traditionally these safeguards have been
understood as process floors. Adding to that understanding entails a measure of
creativity, which undercuts the focal point function of constitutional text and
conventional interpretation.
The textual objection is reinforced by the multiplicity of choices that would
follow. The issue of constitutionalizing undue process is hardly an either/or
proposition. Any such claim requires boundaries and qualifications, so
endorsing the claim's initiation must come with a tolerance for new
constitutional law developed over time. Because government decision making
always imposes costs, familiar practices are bound to be left in doubt as the
details are worked out. If the experience with due process is instructive, judicial
investigation can settle into a standard framework with more specific doctrinal
tributaries; in time, undue process litigation would surely follow a similar
course. But there is serious doubt whether officials should be forced to respond
at all to the predilections of the federal judiciary on questions of "excessive"
decision costs, and no perfect assurance that courts will engineer a
constitutional law of undue process ideally matched to their institutional
limits.249
248. See supra Part lI.B.2.c. While there is no evidence of bad faith, federal judicial
unwillingness to entertain relitigation in the Schiavo controversy is in the same category. See
Schiavo ex rel Schindler v. Schiavo, 404 F.3d 1270, 1274-75 & n.5 (11 th Cir. 2005) (Birch,
J., concurring) (unconvincingly challenging the validity of the Schiavo Act); Samaha, supra
note 23, at 510-16, 528.
249. Whether courts actually will be sensitive to such concerns in addressing undue
process objections is a different matter.
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D. Nightmares Relived
The lessons from the foregoing analysis can be synthesized into three more
specific ideas. First, those concerned with decision costs have every reason to
respect constitutional text and conventional interpretive method. This produces
tension between unbridled normative aspirations and the capacity of federal
constitutional law, but in exchange for sensible results. Second, and similarly,
undue process protection ought to accompany existing constitutional
commitments to nonarbitrary government decision making, private conduct
such as political speech and religious liberty, and equality norms. This is part of
current practice even if not so recognized. Third, any generic undue process
norm backed with judicial review must have serious limits. It could borrow the
Mathews test, but the objection should probably be (1) restricted to agency
adjudication and fenced off from generally applicable rulemaking, (2)
moderated with deference to expert judgment, (3) cognizant of
subconstitutional alternatives, and (4) reconciled with surviving due process
mandates. These ideas now can be illustrated by application to the process
nightmares with which this Article opened. The following remarks are
provisional; relevant information is missing and future developments might
shift the analysis. The more plausible undue process violations nevertheless can
be separated from the less likely.
1. Plausible objections
The Senate filibuster is one of those rare processes vulnerable to a
straightforward textual constitutional objection. Although Article I, Section 5
gives the Senate authority to make rules for its proceedings, 250 that grant
cannot supersede other constitutional requirements. 251 The issue is whether
today's practice conflicts with the best reading of the Constitution on voting
rules, and it certainly might. In sections addressing both legislation and
appointments, the text specifies a supermajority voting rule for certain
situations (veto overrides and treaty ratification) and is silent for others
(passing bills and consenting to appointments).252 Filibuster and cloture
practices function quite like a supermajority rule, especially now when
filibustering senators no longer must take the floor and debate anything. The
exercise bears little relation to information gathering or deliberation. In
addition, the vice president cannot vote in the Senate "unless they [the senators]
be equally divided. 253 This suggests majority voting rules were expected, at
least sometimes, and obviously majority rule was a familiar idea at the
250. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 ("Each House may determine the Rules of its
Proceedings ....").
251. See id. art. V (requiring, in plain text, a two-thirds vote).
252. See id. art. 1, § 7; id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
253. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 4. Credit goes to Adam Cox for pointing this out.
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founding. Of course there are arguments on the other side. These voting rules
might be left for each house to determine, perhaps because the Constitution's
drafters and ratifiers never thought about the question. And occasionally the
text specifies a majority voting rule.254 Hesitance about the constitutional claim
stems from immediate political concerns, which counts for little, but also from
the uncertain effects of revising a complex institution with a substantial
tradition and a web of external relationships. In addition, the issue might not be
justiciable. But these complications should not obscure the conventional
elegance of the objection: it relies on text and simple interpretive tools, it does
not seem contradicted by originalist history, and its success would have a fair
chance of reducing decision costs for both appointments and legislation. One
can embrace the position that the Constitution generally elevates rather than
caps decision costs, and still believe that current filibuster practice is a
forbidden innovation of senatorial clubbishness.
Death row delay and anti-development efforts have less constitutional text
to survey yet they present opportunities for undue process victories. Lackey
claims are attached to the Eighth Amendment's ban on the infliction of "cruel
and unusual punishment." Incarceration pending execution is undoubtedly a
component of punishment and, for some inmates, the psychological stress
might be unnecessarily cruel and atypical. For parts of our country's history,
capital punishment was often carried out expeditiously. 255 More recently, there
are instances of inmates spending a decade or two on death row, perhaps
careening between stays of execution and impending execution dates. And
there is the possibility that courts are ignoring even less salient costs associated
with an elaborate and slow-moving system. Hopes of deterrence, for instance,
fade further under these circumstances. Powerful counterarguments are
available, to be sure. Staying on the dimension of decision costs, the judiciary
requires a test for indefensible delay unless these claims can be tolerably
litigated on a fact-bound basis. Providing that guidance will be challenging,
although not impossible. Speedy trial cases help, since they separate delay
attributable to the defendant from that for which the state is responsible. 256 The
more profound objection concerns capital punishment as a system. A successful
Lackey claimant would presumably receive immunity from the relevant death
254. See id. art. II, § 1, cl. 3 (presidential and vice presidential elections); id. amend.
XII (same); id. amend. XXV, § 2 (filling vice presidential vacancies); id amend. XXV, § 4
(presidential succession); cf id. art. I, § 5, cl. 1 (quorum rule). However, in perhaps none of
these situations is a sitting vice president able to vote per the Senate tie-breaking authority,
so these majority rules are not reaching that territory in a way that directly undercuts the
possibility of an implicit majority voting rule for ordinary legislation and appointments.
255. See Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 993 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari); Robert M. Bohm, The Economic Costs of Capital Punishment: Past,
Present, and Future, in AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS
ON THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION 573, 574 (James R.
Acker et al. eds., 2d ed. 2003).
256. See, e.g., Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 657-58 (1992).
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sentence. 257 But government officials would not lose their ongoing interest in
capital punishment, and we can expect them to avoid the problem by expediting
pending and subsequent cases. Courts might do likewise. Now we are faced
with the problem of rising error costs which, in this context, can be life-
threatening. Unless due process-like mandates are rolled back-which seems
unlikely given the stakes for the defendant and a mountain of text, doctrine, and
tradition-recognizing Lackey claims produces a constitutional pincer. The
system must be extraordinarily accurate and incomparably participatory yet
substantially quicker to judgment. Even ignoring those who might support
endless process in capital cases as second-best to abolition, intensely difficult
trade-offs make this sort of undue process claim controversial even if
understandable.
Cases like the Stroud Township development are simpler. The claim is that
local officials purposefully ignored established procedure to delay and defeat a
low-income housing development. On this account, officials evaded standard
operating procedures to achieve an objective that they were embarrassed or
afraid to accomplish by formal legal amendment. Claims such as this often turn
on disputes of historical fact and official purpose, and they challenge process
with features of adjudication. Granted, officials will present legitimate reasons
for inaction or paperwork, including budget constraints and accuracy in
assessing neighborhood impact. But these issues are pedestrian and
manageable. The claims need not threaten land use regulation per se, at least
when limited to as-applied allegations of lawless attempts to evade those very
practices. Nevertheless, there is reason to be cautious. Claimants might
underestimate the value of state law remedies. And while they may point to the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, we have seen the weakness of
that connection. 258 Furthermore, there is no apparent principle confining these
arguments to land-use matters. Courts might have to recognize an undue
process objection applicable to a large area of process, even if the claim's
elements are easily restricted to arbitrary, irrational, or purposefully lawless
conduct.
2. Implausible objections
The other three "nightmares"-FEMA processing, ossified rulemaking,
and Yucca Mountain-are similar to the Stroud Township affair in that they
lack objections grounded in straightforward textual interpretation. They require
additional ingenuity. But there are deeper reasons why these examples are
unappealing cases for constitutional objection.
257. Usually inmates who want their executions to go forward (eerily labeled
"volunteers") may simply cease litigation and clemency efforts. Conceivably execution
might be indefensibly delayed even though the inmate volunteers; in those situations, a
Lackey claim might be vindicated by an injunction that the execution take place shortly.
258. See supra Part I1.B.2.
December 2006]
HeinOnline  -- 59 Stan. L. Rev. 669 2006-2007
STANFORD LA W REVIEW
Consider FEMA's tardy processing of applications for assistance after
Hurricane Katrina. One distinction is scale. Tens of thousands of people were
eligible for assistance, and FEMA had obligations beyond processing these
requests. Apart from resources issues, the situation was sufficiently complex
that a court might understandably pause before intervening with constitutional
law. Judicial competence is at issue here, although some of FEMA's paper-
pushing duties resemble familiar court activity. But this is not the best reason
for denying undue process claims; the Mathews balancing test already forces
the judiciary to investigate complex administrative systems. The fundamental
problem is that constitutional law is not plainly needed. The APA obligates
courts that have properly acquired jurisdiction to "compel agency action
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed., 259 It is difficult to believe
constitutional law requires more, or that a constitutional label will trigger more
invasive judicial oversight. This might be true even if process rights should be
inspired by dignity theories; such offenses can be labeled "unreasonable."
Lawyers understandably add constitutional claims in an effort to reinforce
statutory arguments, but the district court in the FEMA litigation had no strong
reason to address plaintiffs' constitutional demands.
260
Agency rulemaking might be subject to the same analysis, along with
additional hurdles and twists. With the peanut butter content order fiasco,
shocking decision costs were a product of congressional mandate, an order that
was apparently low on the agency's priority list, and organized economic
interests taking advantage of the resulting process opportunities. 26 1 Perhaps
FDA should have given up in view of the possible benefits of the order, or
moved more aggressively if it was convinced of the public health benefits. But
remember that Congress opened the door to staggering decision costs by
explicitly permitting affected industries in a certain class of cases to demand
259. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006); see supra note 241.
260. See McWaters v. FEMA, 408 F. Supp. 2d 221, 232-33 (E.D. La. 2005) (briefly
addressing and denying the APA and constitutional claims together, leaving open the
possibility of subsequent relief). To be fair, a recognized constitutional norm might prompt
more vigorous judicial use of the APA provision. The district court might have been too shy
in tolerating FEMA processing delays, considering the victims' dire need-and yet the court
was discordantly comfortable ordering the temporary continuation of a hotel/motel housing
program that FEMA wanted to phase out. See id. at 233-37 (relying on statutory
interpretation and victim need). Ordinarily, however, fiscal considerations will legitimately
militate against delay-based undue process claims. They might matter even in a situation like
Katrina. A recent investigation of FEMA's Individuals and Households Program estimated
that $1 billion were improperly awarded out of $6 billion in outlays for Katrina and Rita. See
Waste, Fraud and Abuse in Katrina Aftermath: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Investigations of the H. Comm. on Homeland Security, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of
Gregory D. Kutz & John J. Ryan, U.S. Gov't Accountability Office) (GAO report 06-844T,
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06844t.pdf).
261. Cf Thomas 0. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A
Response to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REv. 525, 533 & n.32 (1997) (asserting that "in
most rulemaking contexts, regulatees have an interest in slowing down the process of writing
rules").
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trial-type hearings on their objections. It is at least possible that FDA would not
have received statutory authority to issue such orders affecting millions of
consumers and sales without this gold-plated process. The coalition responsible
for the statute might have intentionally and even reasonably decided that any
order in this field should come with a process-driven price tag. In some
contrast, the ossification literature often identifies a different syndrome: the
judiciary over-reading congressional mandates and agencies possibly
overreacting to insulate themselves from remand.262 Here the question is,
again, the need for constitutional law. If courts are misinterpreting statutes and
ignoring practical agency needs, constitutional arguments are not obviously
needed or effectual where the judiciary has the final word. Finally, whether or
not a statute requires the decision costs under challenge, these cases involve
prospective generally applicable rules. For reasons given, this is not the most
stable area for judicial intervention. 263
Undue process complaints about the Yucca Mountain repository share
many of these weaknesses. In some ways, this controversy is among the most
frustrating. The political process was responding to the real-world problem of
nuclear waste storage, based on scientific opinion of the NAS. While political
leaders determined a facility should be built, however, the location decision has
consumed decades of process. This is not to say that the scientific debate is
over, or that controversial normative judgments are not involved, or that the
nuclear power industry has not exerted in some sense disproportionate
influence on the issue. Yet there is cause for dismay. The ordinary political
process is already costly, and it concocted an additional layer of procedure that
is extraordinary. Practically every government institution we have is involved,
some at multiple decision points.
At the same time, a constitutional objection is disturbing. First, there is no
apparent conflict with the text or existing judicial judgment. Second, even if the
quasi-Mathews idea could reach this situation, it probably should not. The
decision about a repository in general and Yucca in particular is an extremely
important, large-area decision with a path dependence indicating resilience.
The future of nuclear power could be at stake. Building and stocking the
262. See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 40, at 83-84; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to
Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REv. 59, 65 (1995); see also Kagan, supra note
7, at 2266-67; McGarity, supra note 40, at 1400-01, 1410-20, 1426, 1444. But cf Cary
Coglianese, Empirical Analysis and Administrative Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REv. 1111, 1125-31
(reviewing empirical studies and their skepticism about ossification); Mark Seidenfeld,
Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of
Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REv. 483, 489-90 (1997). The findings of a
deossification critic even suggest that years of delay are at stake. See William S. Jordan 111,
Ossification Revisited. Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review Significantly Interfere with
Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal Rulemaking?, 94 Nw. U. L.
REv. 393, 440-41 (2000) (studying agency action after remand by the D.C. Circuit and
finding agencies are usually able to accomplish their policies after about two years).
263. See supra Part I11.C.2.
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facility is a difficult-to-reverse, multigenerational policy judgment affecting
human health, the environment, energy resources, the economy, and perhaps
national security. 2 64 Finally, one reason for extensive process is to legitimize
decisions. Few can deny the relative inclusiveness of the veto gates erected
here, and few can believe that a federal court has a better sense of when the
debate needs to end. For all of these reasons, one can effectively defend the
siting process from constitutional attack.
CONCLUSION
A concern about decision costs is part of federal constitutional law, and
rightly so. The text itself is used to reduce decision costs. Part of that text,
perhaps most of it, accomplishes nothing else. Some courts have gone further.
They have experimented with a generic undue process claim that could reach as
much government conduct as contemporary due process doctrine. The intention
of these cases seems honorable, and they help expose another dimension to
process-oriented constitutional law. They suggest that a crippled or intransigent
government is no better than an autocratic one. Moreover, a generalized undue
process norm can be sensibly designed for judicial use by concentrating on
agency adjudication instead of prospective rulemaking, incorporating deference
to expert official judgment, and remaining mindful of nonconstitutional
remedies and surviving due process floors.
Still, there are strong reasons for caution. The ideal claim is not necessarily
what the judiciary would produce. In addition, the urge to deploy constitutional
law in these circumstances must be implemented with a kind of creativity that
conflicts with its motivating force. Decision costs are often ordinary costs, and
they can be generated by judicial review no less than nonjudicial decision
making. That said, undue process claims are defensible in particular contexts.
For example, they should be used in service of established constitutional
values, and they already are. It is possible for the judiciary to do somewhat
more without serious risk. But precisely because decision costs matter, the
federal constitutional law of undue process should be like the procedure it tends
to favor: clear-cut, moderate, and usually absent.
264. Compare Fred Dilger & Robert J. Halstead, Integrating Hazards Assessment and
Impact Assessment: The Case of the Caliente Rail Corridor to Yucca Mountain (2005)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.state.nv.us/nucwaste/news2005/
wm/caliente rail.pdf (stressing the danger of transporting waste from over one hundred
sites), with John C. Yoo & Jennifer L. Koester, Judicial Safeguards of Federalism and the
Environment: Yucca Mountain from a Constitutional Perspective, 75 U. COLO. L. REv. 1317,
1336 (2004) (stressing the danger of attack on those existing sites).
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